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PRIVACY, POVERTY, AND BIG DATA: A MATRIX 
OF VULNERABILITIES FOR POOR AMERICANS 
MARY MADDEN*   
MICHELE GILMAN**  
KAREN LEVY***   
ALICE MARWICK****  
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the matrix of vulnerabilities that low-income 
people face as a result of the collection and aggregation of big data and 
the application of predictive analytics. On one hand, big data systems 
could reverse growing economic inequality by expanding access to 
opportunities for low-income people. On the other hand, big data could 
widen economic gaps by making it possible to prey on low-income people 
or to exclude them from opportunities due to biases entrenched in 
algorithmic decision-making tools. New kinds of “networked privacy” 
harms, in which users are simultaneously held liable for their own 
behavior and the actions of those in their networks, may have particularly 
negative impacts on the poor. This Article reports on original empirical 
findings from a large, nationally-representative telephone survey with an 
oversample of low-income American adults, and highlights how these 
patterns make particular groups of low-status Internet users uniquely 
vulnerable to various forms of surveillance and networked privacy-related 
problems. In particular, a greater reliance on mobile connectivity, 
combined with lower usage of privacy-enhancing strategies, may 
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contribute to various privacy and security-related harms. The Article then 
discusses three scenarios in which big data—including data gathered from 
social media inputs—is being aggregated to make predictions about 
individual behavior: employment screening, access to higher education, 
and predictive policing. Analysis of the legal frameworks surrounding 
these case studies reveals a lack of legal protections to counter digital 
discrimination against low-income people. In light of these legal gaps, the 
Article assesses leading proposals for enhancing digital privacy through 
the lens of class vulnerability, including comprehensive consumer privacy 
legislation, digital literacy, notice and choice regimes, and due process 
approaches. As policymakers consider reforms, the Article urges greater 
attention to impacts on low-income persons and communities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Low-income communities have historically been subject to a wide 
range of governmental monitoring and related privacy intrusions in daily 
life.1 The privacy harms that poor communities and their residents suffer 
as a result of pervasive surveillance are especially acute in light of the 
resulting economic and social consequences and the low likelihood that 
they will be able to bear the costs associated with remedying those harms.2 
In the “big data” era, there are growing concerns that low-status Internet 
users who have lower levels of income or education may be further 
differentially impacted by certain forms of Internet-enabled data 
collection, surveillance, and marketing.3 Low-status users may be both 
 
 
 1.  See Michele Estrin Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1389 
(2012) [hereinafter Gilman, Class Differential]; see also Virginia Eubanks, Want to Predict the Future 
of Surveillance? Ask Poor Communities., AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 15, 2014), https://perma.cc/MQ3T-
NWPB. 
 2.  In this Article, poverty is defined as “economic deprivation,” although we do not endorse 
any particular method of measuring poverty. See JOHN ICELAND, POVERTY IN AMERICA: A 
HANDBOOK 23 (3d ed. 2013) (defining poverty). The United States’ official poverty line is an absolute 
measure (based on a needs standard that is constant over time), while relative measures are based on 
comparative disadvantage, fluctuating over time. Id. at 23–24. On the various methods of measuring 
poverty and their merits, see generally id. ch. 3. 
 3.  See NATHAN NEWMAN, HOW BIG DATA ENABLES ECONOMIC HARM TO CONSUMERS, 
ESPECIALLY TO LOW-INCOME AND OTHER VULNERABLE SECTORS OF THE POPULATION (2014), 
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unfairly excluded from opportunities (such as access to credit) and unfairly 
targeted (for example, by predatory marketing strategies) based on 
determinations made by predictive analytics and scoring systems—
growing numbers of which rely on some form of social media input.4 
These new kinds of “networked privacy” harms, in which users are 
simultaneously held liable for their own behavior and the actions of those 
in their networks, could have particularly negative impacts on the poor.5 
In addition to the harms created by targeting or exclusion from 
opportunity, the poor may face magnified privacy vulnerabilities as a 
result of community-specific patterns around technology use and 
knowledge gaps about privacy- and security-protective tools.6 Legal 
scholars have identified a broad group of consumers as “privacy 
vulnerable” when they “misunderstand the scope of data collection and 
falsely believe that relevant privacy rights are enshrined in privacy policies 
and guaranteed by law.”7 These misconceptions are common across all 
socioeconomic categories, but this Article suggests that these conditions 
may be exacerbated by poor communities’ higher reliance on mobile 
connectivity and lower likelihood to take various privacy-protective 
measures online. When low-income adults rely on devices and apps that 
make them more vulnerable to surveillance, and they (wittingly or 
unwittingly) do not restrict access to the content they post online, they 
may be further exposed to forms of commercial data collection that can 
affect the way they are assessed in employment, education, and law 
 
 
https://perma.cc/VB4Y-53SR (public comments filed in response to a Federal Trade Commission 
request for workshop submissions). 
 4.  See Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671 
(2016); see also Jonas Lerman, Big Data and Its Exclusions, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 56 (2013), 
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-and-big-data/big-data-and-its-exclusions (“[B]illions 
of people remain on its margins because they do not routinely engage in activities that big data and 
advanced analytics are designed to capture.”).   
 5.  See danah boyd, Karen Levy & Alice Marwick, The Networked Nature of Algorithmic 
Discrimination, in DATA AND DISCRIMINATION: COLLECTED ESSAYS 53–57 (Seeta Peña 
Gangadharan, Virginia Eubanks & Solon Barocas, eds., 2014), https://perma.cc/V59G-JWDE; see 
generally Alice E. Marwick & danah boyd, Networked Privacy: How Teenagers Negotiate Context in 
Social Media, 16 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1051 (2014), http://nms.sagepub.com/content/16/7/1051. 
 6.  See SEETA PEÑA GANGADHARAN, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, JOINING THE 
SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY? NEW INTERNET USERS IN AN AGE OF TRACKING (2013), https://www. 
newamerica.org/oti/joining-the-surveillance-society/; Jennifer M. Urban & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, The 
Privacy Pragmatic as Privacy Vulnerable, BERKELEY PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER No. 2514381 
(2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2514381 (presented to the Symposium on Usable Privacy and 
Security Workshop on Privacy Personas and Segmentation (PPS)). 
 7.  Urban & Hoofnagle, supra note 6, at 3. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss1/6
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enforcement contexts.8 
Thus, we suggest that poor people are burdened many times over by 
data collection and privacy intrusion. Not only are the poor subject to 
more surveillance than other subpopulations,9 and at higher stakes, but in 
addition, poor Americans’ patterns of privacy-relevant behaviors and 
device use open them up to greater vulnerability. We demonstrate these 
behavioral patterns using original empirical data from a nationally 
representative survey and suggest that differences like these must be 
considered in privacy-protective policymaking and design decisions. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a historical overview 
of the ways in which the poor have been subject to uniquely far-reaching 
surveillance across many aspects of life, and how their experiences of 
harm may be impacted by evolving practices in big-data-driven decision 
making. In using the term “poor” to signify a condition of economic 
deprivation, this Article recognizes that low-income people in America are 
a diverse and multifaceted group and that each person has his or her own 
individualized narrative.10 Despite this diversity, this Article highlights a 
shared reality for many poor people, which is heightened vulnerability to 
online surveillance and associated adverse outcomes. 
Part II presents new empirical findings from a nationally representative 
survey to highlight various technology-related behaviors and concerns that 
suggest low-status Internet users may be especially vulnerable to 
surveillance and networked privacy-related harms. By providing empirical 
data that demonstrates the increased vulnerability of low-income Internet 
users to privacy violations, we identify specific patterns of access and 
behavior that may help inform policy and technology design decisions.11 
 
 
 8.  Part III of this Article discusses various case studies that highlight the scenarios in which 
these assessments may occur. 
 9.  See generally Torin Monahan, Regulating Belonging: Surveillance, Inequality, and the 
Cultural Production of Abjection, 10 J. CULTURAL ECON. 191 (2017). “[S]urveillance manifests as a 
multiplicity of techniques that conjure, coalesce around, and mediate the experiences of abject 
subjects. Abjection signifies not only extreme need or destitution, but also a kind of social exclusion . . 
. .” Id. at 192.   
 10.  See JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE 
LIMITS OF PRIVACY 20–21 (2001) (describing demographic, political, physical, and regional variations 
among poor people); see also Frank Munger, Introduction to LABORING BELOW THE LINE: THE NEW 
ETHNOGRAPHY OF POVERTY, LOW-WAGE WORK, AND SURVIVAL IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 20 
(Frank Munger ed., 2002) (asserting the importance of seeing and understanding the poor as 
individuals with their own narratives).     
 11.  For more on the use of empirical data in legal scholarship, see Theodore Eisenberg, Why Do 
Empirical Legal Scholarship? 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV 1741 (2004); Daniel Ho & Larry Kramer, 
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In Part III, we show why and how this matters through a legal 
examination of several timely case studies that demonstrate how online 
activity, and the emerging use of social media data in particular, might 
have detrimental impacts on the poor when used in high-stakes decision-
making systems. This Part explains why current legal frameworks fail to 
shield the poor from negative outcomes. 
Finally, in Part IV, we assess major proposals for protecting personal 
data through the lens of class vulnerability. In other words, we evaluate 
how these proposals might impact poor people. We agree with other 
scholars that additional technical and non-technical reforms are needed to 
address the risks associated with the use of social media data. As 
policymakers consider reforms, we urge greater attention to how reforms 
may differentially impact low-income communities. 
 
I. THE INTERSECTION OF PRIVACY AND POVERTY 
A. Brief History of Privacy-Related Vulnerabilities and Surveillance of the 
Poor 
Historically, the poor have had far less control over the privacy of their 
homes, bodies, and decisions than their more affluent counterparts.12 In 
Colonial America, most towns had an “overseer of the poor” who tracked 
poor people and either chased them out of town or auctioned them off for 
free labor.13 By the 1800s, when poorhouses became the dominant poor 
relief policy, the poor were warehoused in dismal quarters where they 
labored under the watchful eye of the “keeper.”14 Even as anti-poverty 
policy became more benevolent in the late 1800s, the scientific charity 
movement relied on “friendly visitors” to investigate the homes of the 
poor and exhort them to higher morals.15 For over three centuries, 
surveillance in various forms has served the political purposes of 
“containment of alleged social contagion, evaluation of moral suitability 
for inclusion in public life and its benefits, and suppression of working 
 
 
Introduction: The Empirical Revolution in Law, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1195 (2013). 
 12.  See GILLIOM, supra note 10, at 23.   
 13.  See WALTER TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL 
WELFARE IN AMERICA 9–10 (6th ed. 1999).   
 14.  See id. at 57–61; MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL 
HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 27–28 (10th ed. 1996). 
 15.  See KATZ, supra note 14, at 70; TRATTNER, supra note 13, at 91–92. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss1/6
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people’s resistance and collective power.”16   
The New Deal created the modern welfare state and continued this 
history of surveillance of the “undeserving poor” (that is, able-bodied 
adults who were considered capable of work).17 In administering welfare, 
states devised a variety of discretionary surveillance tactics—such as 
midnight raids on welfare recipients’ homes and moral fitness tests—
designed to reduce the welfare rolls and push poor women, mostly of 
color, into the low-wage labor force.18 Today, states subject single mothers 
who draw public assistance to drug tests, DNA testing of children, 
fingerprinting, extreme verification requirements, and intrusive 
questioning about intimate relationships.19 Some scholars and judges have 
argued that higher-income Americans would object if the government 
treated them similarly in exchange for the valuable governmental benefits 
they receive, such as mortgage deductions, school loans, and child care tax 
credits.20 As Justice Douglas stated in his dissent to the Supreme Court’s 
upholding of welfare home visits, “[n]o such sums are spent policing the 
government subsidies granted to farmers, airlines, steamship companies, 
and junk mail dealers, to name but a few.”21 
The structure of the current welfare system aims to put poor women to 
 
 
 16.  Virginia Eubanks, Technologies of Citizenship: Surveillance and Political Learning in the 
Welfare System, in SURVEILLANCE AND SECURITY: TECHNOLOGICAL POLITICS AND POWER IN 
EVERYDAY LIFE (Torin Monahan ed., 2006) [hereinafter Eubanks, Technologies of Citizenship]. 
 17.  On the New Deal division between deserving and undeserving poor, see Michele Estrin 
Gilman, The Return of the Welfare Queen, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 247, 257–58 (2014) 
and sources cited therein.   
 18.  See KAARYN S. GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 21 (2011) ("The unstated but underlying goals of the rules were to 
police and punish the sexuality of single mothers, to close off the indirect access to government 
support of able-bodied men, to winnow the welfare rolls, and to reinforce the idea that families 
receiving aid were entitled to no more than near-desperate living standards."). 
 19.  See Kaaryn Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization of Low-Income 
Women, U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 297, 312–321 (2013) [hereinafter Gusafson, Degradation Ceremonies]; 
Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 113, 114–16 (2011) 
(discussing Medicaid program); Gilman, Class Differential, supra note 1, at 1397–1400 (discussing 
welfare).  
 20.  See Jordan C. Budd, A Fourth Amendment for the Poor Alone: Subconstitutional Status and 
the Myth of the Inviolate Home, 85 IND. L.J. 355, 404–05 (2010); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, 
THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 191 
(1995) (“[M]iddle-class families benefit from extensive entitlement programs, be they FHA or VA 
loans at below mortgage market rates or employer subsidized health and life insurance. These families 
receive untaxed benefits as direct subsidies.”). 
 21.  Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 332 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting J. Skelly 
Wright, Poverty, Minorities, and Respect for Law, 1970 DUKE L.J. 425, 427–38 (1970)).  
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work.22 Yet the low-wage workplace, where one-third of workers toil,23 is 
no escape from surveillance. Employers today log computer key strokes, 
listen to telephone calls, review emails and Internet usage, conduct drug 
tests, employ mystery shoppers, watch closed-circuit television, and 
require psychometric and “honesty” tests as conditions of employment.24 
Employers increasingly track employee movements through GPS or radio 
frequency devices, which “create new streams of data about where 
employees are during the workday, what they are doing, how long their 
tasks take, and whether they comply with employment rules.”25 These 
sorts of tools seem to have found broad use in low-wage workplaces in 
particular,26 and may be purposefully overt (rather than invisible) in order 
to let workers know they are being watched and to control their behavior. 
Other forms of surveillance are more covert; the objects of surveillance are 
not conscious that they are being observed. These behavioral control 
mechanisms can take many forms—at their most extreme, they include the 
use of facial recognition technology to ensure employees are smiling 
enough and audio recording to monitor employees’ tone of voice.27 Thus, 
from welfare to work and beyond, low-income people have been subject to 
covert and overt surveillance as tools of control. 
 
 
 22.  The current welfare program is called Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) and 
was created by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104–193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections at 43 U.S.C. § 605(a) 
(2000)). The work requirements are at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2012). 
 23.  See Gilman, supra note 1, at 1400. 
 24.  The Converus company offers a retina-based lie detector technology called EyeDetect, to 
screen potential employees. Job Applicant and Employment Screening, CONVERUS, http://converus. 
com/pre-employment-ongoing-screening/. See generally Kirstie Ball, Workplace Surveillance: An 
Overview, 51 LAB. HIST. 87 (2010); Alex Rosenblat, Tamara Kneese & danah boyd, Workplace 
Surveillance, DATA & SOC’Y RESEARCH INST. (2014), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2536605; Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, 
Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).   
 25.  Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Managing 
Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 112–13 (2010).  
 26.  See id. (describing sensors on company trucks and cars and Bank of America monitoring of 
call-center employees); Karen E. C. Levy, The Contexts of Control: Information, Power, and Truck-
Driving Work, 31 THE INFO. SOC’Y 160 (2015); Gilman, Class Differential, supra note 1, at 1400–03. 
 27.  Sally Davies, From a Frown to a Smile, the Technology That’s in Your Face, FIN. TIMES 
(Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ccaac9e6-6f06-11e3-9ac9-00144feabdc0.html; Rachel 
Emma Silverman, Tracking Sensors Invade the Workplace—Monitors on Workers, Furniture Offer 
Clues for Boosting Productivity; Switching to Bigger Lunch Tables, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 7, 2013, 11:42 
AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324034804578344303429080678; Suzanne 
McGee, How Employers Tracking Your Health Can Cross the Line and Become Big Brother, 
GUARDIAN (May 1, 2015, 8:30 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/us-money-blog/2015/ 
may/01/employers-tracking-health-fitbit-apple-watch-big-brother.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss1/6
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B. The Evolving Nature of Privacy Harms Experienced by the Poor 
While many Americans express unease over a perceived loss of 
privacy,28 the harms to the poor from surveillance regimes reach far 
beyond generalized anxiety.29 This is because many surveillance systems 
that surround the poor are purposefully designed to deliver a message of 
stigma to the subject while reinforcing societal stereotypes about 
dependency.30 In turn, these stereotypes drive punitive laws directed at the 
poor.31 Even if they are not always visible, privacy harms to the poor are 
real and can have physical and psychological impacts. For instance, 
surveillance can discourage the poor from accessing needed help or 
engaging with social and financial institutions due to fears associated with 
monitoring.32 Moreover, welfare recipients suffer psychological injuries 
related to a loss of self-agency and reproach that can further trap them 
below the poverty line.33 Similarly, in the low-wage workplace, invasive 
surveillance can result in disproportionate levels of psychological 
problems, including depression, which in turn may lower employee 
productivity and employer profits.34   
 
 
 28.  On public opinion regarding privacy and its trade-offs, see Lee Rainie & Shiva Maniam, 
Americans Feel the Tensions Between Privacy and Security Concerns, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 19, 2016), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/19/americans-feel-the-tensions-between-privacy-and-
security-concerns/.  
 29.  See Gilman, supra note 1, at 1394. 
 30.  See Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies, supra note 19 at 343–44, 354; Harry Murray, 
Deniable Degradation: The Finger-Imaging of Welfare Recipients, 15 SOC. F. 39, 40–42 (2000). 
 31.  See Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies, supra note 19, at 348; LOЇC WACQUANT, 
PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY 1–3 (2009). 
 32.  See Sarah Brayne, Surveillance and System Avoidance: Criminal Justice Contact and 
Institutional Attachment, 79 AM. SOC. REV. 367 (2014); ROBERT MOFFITT ET AL., DEP’T OF HEALTH 
& HUMAN SERVS., A STUDY OF TANF NON-ENTRANTS: FINAL REPORT TO THE OFFICE OF THE 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION 2, 14 (2003) (reporting that new welfare 
report policies discourage participation).   
 33.  See Nancy Goodban, The Psychological Impact of Being on Welfare, 59 SOC. SERV. REV. 
403 (1985); GILLIOM, supra note 10, at 66–67, 78 (summarizing interviews with welfare recipients in 
Appalachia in the early 1990s); Nora Jacobson, A Taxonomy of Dignity:A Grounded Theory Study, 9 
BMC INT’L HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 3, 7 (2009) (when the state treats marginalized people with a lack 
of dignity, the results can include “loss of respect, loss of self-worth, ego, sense of self, and soul, loss 
of status, social standing, and moral standing, loss of confidence and determination”).   
 34.  See David Holman, Claire Chissick & Peter Totterdell, The Effects of Performance 
Monitoring on Emotional Labor and Well-Being in Call Centers, 26 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 57, 74–
79 (2002); Debora Jeske & Alecia M. Santuzzi, Monitoring What and How: Psychological 
Implications of Electronic Performance Monitoring, 30 NEW TECH., WORK & EMP. 62 (2015); M.J. 
Smith et al., Employee Stress and Health Complaints in Jobs with and Without Electronic 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The class differential in privacy harms also extends to life online. In 
the early days of the Internet, the poor faced a stark digital divide—they 
were excluded from online life due to an inability to afford computers and 
broadband access.35 These days, low-income Americans are increasingly 
online, often through the use of smartphones.36 Mobile access has helped 
to narrow the digital divide, but has left low-income Americans vulnerable 
to new forms of tracking. Poor Americans are considerably less likely to 
use Apple phones, which provide more robust encryption and are 
generally less susceptible to being hacked compared to their less 
expensive Android counterparts.37 Wealthy and higher-educated 
Americans are more likely to use iPhones, on which data is encrypted by 
default and is more difficult for police, government, or phone companies 
to intercept.38  
Beyond access, researchers have brought attention to the digital literacy 
skills divide, which can also impact low-income Internet users’ exposure 
to privacy- and security-related harms.39 In addition, certain inequalities 
relate not to low-income Americans being more likely to experience a 
given harm, but to their propensity to face harsher consequences as a result 
of those harms, in part due to a lack of resources to seek redress. Consider 
identity theft, a growing concern shared across social classes. This crime is 
particularly devastating for low-income individuals, who face not only 
financial losses that impact their ability to meet basic needs such as 
housing and utility services, but are also left coping with more severe 
consequences of someone else using their identity, such as wrongful 
arrests, improper child support garnishments, and harassment by collection 
 
 
Performance Monitoring, 23 APPLIED ERGONOMICS 17, 23–27 (1992); Scott C. D’Urso, Who’s 
Watching Us at Work? Toward a Structural-Perceptual Model of Electronic Monitoring and 
Surveillance in Organizations, 16 COMM. THEORY 281, 287 (2006).    
 35.  See generally Janet Thompson Jackson, Capitalizing on Digital Entrepreneurship for Low-
Income Residents and Communities, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 187 (2009). 
 36.  See Aaron Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 1, 2015), 
http://www.pewInternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphone-use-in-2015/.  
 37.  See Aaron Smith, Smartphone Ownership–2013 Update, PEW RES. CTR. (June 5, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/KE53-9R5X; ACLU Complaint, Request for Investigation and Complaint for 
Injunctive Relief, Apr. 16, 2013, available at https://perma.cc/W9AT-YUFD. 
 38.  See Christopher Soghoian, Your Smartphone is a Civil Rights Issue, TED TALK (Oct. 2016), 
https://perma.cc/29ZQ-MFFB; Kaveh Waddell, Encryption is a Luxury, ATLANTIC (Mar. 28, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/DY7K-PTWY. 
 39.  See Eszter Hargittai, Second-Level Digital Divide: Differences in People’s Online Skills, 7 
FIRST MONDAY (2002), https://perma.cc/A3FA-W9D2; Paul DiMaggio et al., From Unequal Access to 
Differentiated Use: A Literature Review and Agenda for Research on Digital Inequality, in SOCIAL 
INEQUALITY 355 (Kathryn Neckerman, ed., 2004). 
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agencies.40  
It is also important to recognize that for the poor, overt and covert 
surveillance systems interact with one another. For instance, after the 
welfare system collects an applicant’s data, this data is electronically 
shared and compared across multiple government and commercial 
databases in order to determine eligibility and ferret out fraud. These 
systems have the potential to make the application process easier and more 
streamlined for both social service offices and applicants.41 At the same 
time, these databases are plagued with outdated, inaccurate, and 
incomplete data.42 As a result, thousands of people have been denied 
benefits to which they would otherwise be entitled. 43  
On a day-to-day basis, welfare benefits and food stamps are distributed 
electronically and monitored to see how recipients are spending their 
money, thereby limiting “clients’ autonomy, opportunity, and mobility: 
their ability to meet their needs in their own way.”44 Moreover, public 
benefits data is fed to law enforcement systems and vice-versa, in an 
ongoing loop of digital records sharing.45 In addition, the personal data 
held in public benefits systems is at risk of security breaches. For instance, 
the Lifeline program, which provides wireless phones to low-income 
people, requires applicants to share personally identifiable information 
including income, social security numbers, and drivers’ license numbers.46 
The communications industry has fought proposed government 
requirements that they keep this data secure.47  
In sum, surveillance of the poor is broader, more invasive, and more 
difficult to redress than surveillance of other groups, and the overlap 
among government, commercial, and institutional data flows creates 
unique challenges for maintaining the accuracy and security of records. 
 
 
 40.  See Sarah Dranoff, Identity Theft: A Low-Income Issue, 17 AM. BAR ASSOC. DIALOGUE 
MAG., Winter 2014, https://perma.cc/ES6W-QFZ8.  
 41.  See STAN DORN & ELIZABETH LOWER-BASCH, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, MOVING TO 
21ST-CENTURY PUBLIC BENEFITS: EMERGING OPTIONS, GREAT PROMISE, AND KEY CHALLENGES 4–6 
(2012), https://perma.cc/SHM2-KX8L. 
 42.  See id. at 15–19; Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1249, 1256–58 (2008). 
 43.  Id. at 1256–57, 1268–73.  
 44.  See Eubanks, Technologies of Citizenship, supra note 16, at 90–91.  
 45.  See Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 
647, 667–71 (2009).   
 46.  See Margaret Harding McGill, CTIA Defends Its Challenge of FCC Lifeline Privacy 
Changes, LAW 360 (Oct. 20, 2015, 6:02 PM), https://perma.cc/7KJ4-K28Y. 
 47.  See id.  
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Low-income Americans live in communities with overt and omnipresent 
surveillance, and this oppression extends into the more covert surveillance 
that happens online. In both systems, the harms suffered by the poor can 
be concrete and stigmatizing. 
C. Big Data Analytics, Social Media, and the Potential for Negative 
Impacts Among Low-Income Communities 
Poor Americans face heightened risks from big data (that is, the 
collection, aggregation, analysis, and use of mass amounts of digital 
information gathered and shared about individuals).48 Big data “gathers its 
contents from a myriad of online user interactions and infrastructure 
sensors, ranging from online transactions, search queries, and health 
records to communication networks, electric grids, and mobile phones.”49 
Big data systems scoop up personal information when people shop in 
stores or online, visit websites, pay bills, use social media and mobile 
applications, or use devices such as fitness trackers.50 Certain systems then 
combine that information with more “traditional” metrics that are used to 
evaluate individuals—such as credit history, criminal background records, 
and educational testing scores.51 Big data holds tremendous promise to 
improve problem solving through greater insight into complex issues. It 
also raises the peril of information mischaracterization, misinterpretation, 
and abuse—all without the knowledge of the subjects whose data is being 
manipulated.52   
The obfuscation of big data methods that now occurs across many 
industries has been variably described by scholars as creating a “black box 
society,”53 a “transparency paradox,”54 and a lack of “algorithmic 
 
 
 48.  See Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to 
Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 96 (2014).   
 49.  Id. at 96. 
 50.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION?  
UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES 1 (2016), https://perma.cc/5LAG-83MZ. 
 51.  See generally infra case studies discussed in Part III. 
 52.  See generally danah boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations 
for a Cultural, Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 662, 663 
(2012), https://perma.cc/5BLE-KFBC (“Like other socio-technical phenomena, Big Data triggers both 
utopian and dystopian rhetoric.”). 
 53.  FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL 
MONEY AND INFORMATION 3 (2015). 
 54.  Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Three Paradoxes of Big Data, 66 STAN. L. REV. 41, 
42 (2013). 
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accountability.”55 Limited public awareness about these practices has 
contributed to a regulatory environment in which the aggregation and 
brokering of personal data has largely gone unchecked.56 This has renewed 
concerns about the impact of these information asymmetries on low-
income populations, and the extent to which these dynamics may be 
contributing to increases in economic inequality in the United States.57 
On the surface, big data collection may appear to be less stigmatizing 
for the poor than many of their other interpersonal interactions with the 
government because it is invisible. Algorithmic assessments that passively 
take one’s online activities into account do not make the same kind of 
dehumanizing requests of low-income people (such as asking for urine 
samples or sexual history) as is sometimes required during the process of 
seeking public benefits.58 Yet, the use of big data can injure the economic 
stability and civil rights of the poor, such as when they are targeted for 
predatory financial products, charged more for goods and services online, 
or profiled in ways that limit their employment and educational 
opportunities.59 Conversely, big data can also result in the exclusion of 
marginalized groups from desirable opportunities “because they are less 
involved in the formal economy and its data-generating activities [or 
because they] have unequal access to and relatively less fluency in the 
technology necessary to engage online, or are less profitable customers or 
important constituents and therefore less interesting as targets of 
observation.”60   
Many poor people, and particularly low-income people of color, live in 
crowded urban environments that are under constant surveillance by law 
 
 
 55.  ALEX ROSENBLAT, TAMARA KNEESE & DANAH BOYD, ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY, 
DATA & SOC’Y RES. INST. (2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2535540. 
 56.  See Alice E. Marwick, How Your Data Are Being Deeply Mined, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 9, 
2014, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/how-your-data-are-being-deeply-mined/. 
 57.  See Newman, supra note 3, at 2–3; FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR 
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 46–48 (2014), https://perma.cc/CAZ5-54PC; EXEC. OFFICE 
OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES 6–7 (2014), 
https://perma.cc/C6SB-BLC6 [hereinafter SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES]; Joseph W. Jerome, Buying and 
Selling Privacy: Big Data’s Different Burdens and Benefits, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47, 51 (2013) 
(“Most of the biggest concerns we have about big data—discrimination, profiling, tracking, 
exclusion—threaten the self-determination and personal autonomy of the poor more any other class.”).   
 58.  See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 59.  See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 50, at 9–11 (summarizing concerns raised by 
stakeholders). 
 60.  See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 685. 
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enforcement.61 As a result, they are much more likely than people in other 
contexts to become entangled with the criminal justice and child welfare 
systems, both of which are highly stigmatizing and privacy-stripping.62 
These interactions then become embedded in big data inputs and 
assessments, which in turn limits housing, employment, and educational 
opportunities for those affected.63 At the same time, big data analysis of 
poor peoples’ information is aggregated and used to craft policies and 
rules that then shape poor peoples’ lives. As one commentator noted with 
regard to the collection of data from homeless people as a condition of 
receiving services, “whether or not a specific individual can be related 
back to data generated out of that individual, the life of that data will 
absorb and transform the life of that individual.”64 
The practice of specifically incorporating social media data into big 
data systems is becoming increasingly common in a wide range of 
industries. While thousands of data points—including both structured and 
unstructured data—may feed into various assessment tools, unique 
features of social media data can make it especially problematic for 
ensuring fairness and preventing bias in various forms of decision-
making.65 As boyd et al. argue, the value in analyzing social media data 
stems, in part, from the ability to assess both to whom you are connected 
and “who[m] you are like” based on your behavior and preferences. This 
information becomes valuable to a range of entities, from marketers to 
employers to law enforcement.66 
Poor Americans have long suffered from guilt by association, meaning 
they bear the stereotypes and stigma of their social class (and race and 
gender) in ways that impede their economic progress and well-being.67 As 
 
 
 61.  See Kathryne M. Young & Joan Petersilia, Keeping Track: Surveillance, Control, and the 
Expansion of the Carceral State, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1322 (2016); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE 
NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 124–26 (2013); LORI BETH 
WAY & RYAN PATTEN, HUNTING FOR “DIRTBAGS”: WHY COPS OVER-POLICE THE POOR AND RACIAL 
MINORITIES 3, 5, 103, 116, 136 (2013).  
 62.  On criminal justice, see id. On child welfare, see generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED 
BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 8 (2002).  
 63.  See infra Part III. On the loss of opportunities wrought by possessing a criminal record, see 
generally JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD, 225–314 (2015).  
 64.  Craig Willse, “Universal Data Elements,” or the Biopolitical Life of Homeless Populations, 
5 SURVEILLANCE & SOC. 227, 245 (2008).   
 65.  See boyd et al., supra note 5, at 43–57.  
 66.  Id. 
 67.  See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, BLAME WELFARE, IGNORE POVERTY 
AND INEQUALITY 70 (2007); Heather E. Bullock, Justifying Inequality: A Social Psychological 
Analysis of Beliefs About Poverty and the Poor, in THE COLORS OF POVERTY: WHY RACIAL AND 
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scholars who study the surveillance of marginalized groups have noted, 
“networks of association are not random, and who we know online is 
affected by offline forms of residential, educational, and occupational 
segregation.”68 The case studies in this Article highlight concrete examples 
of how these guilt-by-association effects, when paired with the networked 
nature of social media data, may exacerbate big data-related harms for the 
poor. 
Simply opting out from using social media and other digital 
technologies to avoid these risks is not an option in today’s digital world, 
and may be impossible for some forms of surveillance.69 Increasingly, 
institutions—such as schools, workplaces, and social service agencies—
require engagement on certain platforms to get access to information and 
resources. Internet access has become an essential conduit for commerce, 
educational information, job opportunities, government services, and to 
maintain social connections to friends and family. Low-income adults 
recognize these benefits, with more than eight in ten saying the Internet 
has improved their ability to “learn new things” and majorities reporting 
that the Internet has made them better informed about products and 
services.70 If low-income users were to opt out of using certain websites or 
applications due to privacy concerns, they would also lose the ability to 
access the myriad opportunities associated with engagement in online life. 
II. SURVEY OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY CONCERNS OF LOW-INCOME 
INDIVIDUALS 
Low-income individuals, then, face pervasive and disproportionate 
scrutiny in connection with government services, institutional 
involvement, and low-wage work, and face new and evolving challenges 
due to the advent of big data analytics and “guilt by association.” But in 
addition to these, poor Americans’ patterns of technology use and privacy-
relevant behaviors expose them to greater risk than their wealthier 
counterparts. In Part II, we demonstrate these disparities empirically. 
 
 
ETHNIC DISPARITIES PERSIST 52, 57 (Ann Chih Lin & David R. Harris eds., 2008). 
 68.  Eubanks, supra note 1. 
 69.  Sarah Kessler, Think You Can Live Offline Without Being Tracked? Here’s What It Takes, 
FAST COMPANY (Oct. 15, 2013, 6:00 AM), https://perma.cc/Q5UQ-42UY. 
 70.  Kristen Purcell & Lee Rainie, Americans Feel Better Informed Thanks to the Internet, PEW 
RES. CTR. 2 (DEC. 8, 2014), https://perma.cc/R3DC-JGE4.  
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A. Challenges in Demonstrating Harm and Need for Empirical Research 
Highlighting Unique Vulnerabilities of Low-Income Groups 
Prior empirical studies have found that low-income Internet users are 
significantly more likely than higher-income users to report negative 
experiences connected to their online activity.71 For instance, poorer 
Internet users are more likely to say they had an email or social media 
account compromised, and are more likely to report having their 
reputation damaged by online activity.72 However, the reporting of 
privacy-related harms in surveys relies on respondents being aware of the 
negative impacts in question. In cases of big-data-related decision-making 
and discrimination, it is nearly impossible for respondents to know what 
personal or behavioral information may have factored into an unfavorable 
outcome.    
Recent qualitative studies have focused on understanding what 
behaviors might be associated with privacy-related vulnerabilities among 
low-status users. For instance, researchers have suggested that “marginal 
Internet users” who rely on digital literacy organizations for training and 
access, may be more likely to engage in online behaviors that make them 
susceptible to potential privacy problems, such as being tracked with third-
party cookies or unwittingly disclosing their information to fraudulent or 
predatory websites.73 In addition, legal scholars have noted the need for 
analysis that examines whether or not low-status users face magnified 
privacy vulnerabilities due to knowledge gaps about privacy and security-
related tools.74 
We build upon this framework of understanding privacy-related 
vulnerabilities and provide new insights into the behaviors and attitudes of 
low-income Internet and social media users, which are of particular 
relevance to discussions of big-data-driven analysis. In the section that 
follows, we address the intersection of privacy-related vulnerabilities and 
socioeconomic status through an empirical examination of tech-related 
behaviors among low-income groups, using data from a new, nationally 
representative survey. And while income is the primary focus of our 
analysis, it is not the only indicator of a person’s socioeconomic status 
(SES). For instance, the American Psychological Association broadly 
 
 
 71.  Lee Rainie et al., Anonymity, Privacy, and Security Online, PEW RES. CTR. 24 (Sept. 15, 
2013), https://perma.cc/JT98-FCZ5. 
 72.  Id.  
 73.  Gangadharan, supra at 6. 
 74.  Urban & Hoofnagle, supra note 10, at 4. 
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defines socioeconomic status as “the social standing or class of an 
individual or group,” which is “often measured as a combination of 
education, income and occupation.”75 
B. Survey Methods and Goals 
In order to help address the question of how privacy and security 
experiences vary across different socioeconomic groups, the Digital Trust 
Foundation supported the fielding of a robust, nationally representative 
twenty-minute random-digit-dial telephone survey of 3000 American 
adults eighteen and older. The sample included an oversample of adults 
with annual household incomes of less than $40,000.76 This survey, 
fielded in November and December of 2015, explores how low-income 
adults’ concerns about privacy fit into the larger scope of concerns they 
have in everyday life, and contributes to a deeper understanding of their 
technology-related behaviors and beliefs.77 
Among the key findings in this new survey are several that suggest 
greater privacy-related vulnerabilities among low-income Internet users as 
compared to higher income groups. While some of these differences may 
be influenced by multiple contributing factors (such as one’s age and 
education level), examining variations through the lens of income helps to 
inform policy and technology design decisions that are specifically 
tailored for low-income groups. In particular, the discussion that follows 
highlights certain sociotechnical behaviors that, when combined with a 
lack of sufficient legal protections and rapidly evolving industry practices, 
may result in increased exposure to surveillance and big-data related 
 
 
 75.  See AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON SOCIOECONOMIC 
STATUS (2007), http://www.apa.org/pi/ses/resources/publications/task-force-2006.pdf (also noting that 
various indicators are often overlapping; those who live with lower household incomes also tend to 
have lower education levels and work in low-wage jobs).  
 76.  This level of annual income represents roughly 200% of the current federal poverty level for 
a household of three. See 2015 Poverty Guideline, ASPE (2015), https://perma.cc/7VBF-UGKR. 
Current estimates from the Census Bureau suggest the average household size in the U.S. is 2.54 
people. See Families and Living Arrangements, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://perma.cc/53JT-3XYC. 
The survey included a standard measure of an individual’s household income that asks each participant 
to report their “total family income from all sources, before taxes” for the previous year. Id. 
 77.  Co-author Mary Madden is also the Principal Investigator for this project. The main survey 
report is scheduled for publication in 2017 and will include a detailed discussion of methods and 
sample design. Mary Madden, Privacy, Security and Digital Inequality: How Technology Experiences 
and Resources Vary Based on Socioeconomic Status and Race, DATA & SOC’Y RESEARCH INST. 
(forthcoming 2017). See infra Appendix for a summary of methods used for the survey.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
70 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 95:53 
 
 
 
 
harms among low-status groups.78  
C. Patterns of Mobile Internet Use Unique to Low-Income Populations 
Echoing previous findings from a wide range of empirical studies, the 
survey results indicate that low-income Internet users who own 
smartphones are significantly more likely than higher income groups to 
say they “mostly go online” using their cell phone.79 Even when 
considering the fact that low-income adults are less likely to be Internet 
users and less likely to own smartphones overall, the share of low-income 
adults who rely on their mobile devices as their primary source of Internet 
connectivity still exceeds that of higher income groups.  
Overall, 39% of all Internet users who own a smartphone say that their 
cell phone is the primary way they go online. Another 41% say they 
mostly use some other device, and 20% report that they use their cell 
phone and other devices equally. However, the differences at either end of 
the income spectrum are stark; 63% of smartphone Internet users who live 
in households earning less than $20,000 per year say they mostly go online 
using their cell phone, compared with just 21% of those in households 
earning $100,000 or more per year. 
The survey findings also suggest that age is an important indicator; 
looking at broader income groups (less than $40,000 per year vs. $40,000 
per year or more), Internet users ages eighteen to twenty-nine who have a 
smartphone and are in the lower income bracket are more likely to report a 
reliance on cell phones for Internet access when compared with young 
adults living in higher income households (62% vs. 46%).80 However, 
there is an even larger gap among lower income smartphone owners ages 
thirty to forty-nine, who are more than twice as likely as higher income 
adults of the same age to say they mostly go online using their phone 
(71% vs. 29%).  
 
 
 
 
 
 78.  All differences noted between various comparison groups discussed throughout this section 
are statistically significant. The differences were evaluated with an independent Z-test for significance 
at the 95% confidence level. 
 79.  Maeve Duggan & Aaron Smith, Cell Internet Use 2013, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 16, 2013), 
https://perma.cc/49NH-37NN. 
 80.  These broader income categories (<$40K/$40K+) are used when analyzing detailed age 
groups in order to allow for a large enough sample to make valid comparisons. 
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D. Privacy and Security Vulnerabilities Associated with Reliance on 
Mobile Devices 
Recent media coverage about the strong encryption available on Apple 
iPhones has largely overshadowed the many well-documented privacy 
vulnerabilities associated with mobile devices and applications.81 While 
current versions of the Apple iOS operating system may make it difficult 
for law enforcement to access the contents of a locked phone, cell phone 
users are still subject to a wide range of mobile surveillance possibilities 
that they may be unaware of, including advertisers’ cross-device 
tracking,82 cell site simulators83 and in-store tracking by retailers.84 In 
particular, location-related data, when gathered from mobile devices over 
a period of time and tied to both online and offline behaviors, can reveal 
an incredibly intimate portrait of users’ daily lives. 
 
 
 81.  See Paarijaat Aditya, et al., Brave New World: Privacy Risks for Mobile Users, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM MOBICOM WORKSHOP ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN MOBILE 
ENVIRONMENTS 7 (2014), https://perma.cc/3FQL-TXMP. 
 82.  Michael Whitener, Cookies Are So Yesterday; Cross-Device Tracking Is In—Some Tips, 
PRIVACY ADVISOR (Jan. 27, 2015), https://perma.cc/5WAZ-824G. 
 83.  See Kim Zetter, Turns Out Police Stingray Spy Tools Can Indeed Record Calls, WIRED 
MAG. (Oct. 28, 2015, 3:00 PM), https://perma.cc/7GJ8-UEH4. 
 84.  See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Retail Tracking Firm Settles FTC Charges It Misled 
Consumers About Opt Out Choices (Apr. 23, 2015), available at https://perma.cc/7H2P-9GSB. 
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Table 1. Mostly Mobile Internet Use by Income 
 
Responses to the question: “Overall, when you use the Internet, do 
you do that mostly using your cell phone or mostly using some 
other device like a desktop, laptop or tablet computer?” 
  
Internet 
users who 
own a 
smartphone 
 
Less than 
$20K 
 
$20K-
unde
r 
$40K 
 
$40K- 
under 
$75K 
 
$75K- 
under 
$100
K 
 
$100K 
or more 
 
 (a)  (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Mostly on cell 
phone 
 
39%  63%def 58%def 34%f 24% 21% 
Mostly on 
something else 
 
41%  22% 28% 42%bc 61%bcd 52%bc 
Both equally 
(Volunteered) 
20%  14% 13% 24%bc 15% 26%bce 
 
Note: Significant differences within rows are noted with superscript 
letters indicating the column to which the item should be 
compared. For instance, the 63% of those in households earning 
less than $20,000 per year who say they use the Internet mostly 
from their cell phone is significantly higher than those in 
households earning $40,000 or more. The differences noted here 
were evaluated with an independent Z-test for significance at the 
95% confidence level. Column (a), which displays responses for 
all Internet users who own a smartphone, is not included in the 
significance testing. A small number of users (1% or less) offered 
a volunteered response of “It depends” or “Don’t know” in 
response to this question; those responses are omitted. 
 
Source: Privacy and Security Experience of Low-Socioeconomic 
Status Populations Survey, November 18–December 23, 2015, 
including an oversample of adults living in households earning 
less than $40,000 per year. Interviews were conducted in English 
and Spanish (Total n=3,000 US adults age 18 and older, n=1,724 
for Internet users who own a smartphone). 
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A recent study published in Nature magazine illustrated that human 
mobility traces are a highly unique and sensitive form of data that pose 
considerable re-identification risks with only a handful of spatio-temporal 
data points. As the authors note:  
Mobility data is among the most sensitive data currently being 
collected. Mobility data contains the approximate whereabouts of 
individuals and can be used to reconstruct individuals' movements 
across space and time . . . . While in the past, mobility traces were 
only available to mobile phone carriers, the advent of smartphones 
and other means of data collection has made these broadly 
available.85 
Beyond the broadcasting of location-related data, mobile applications 
create various vulnerabilities for smartphone users who rely on their 
phones as their primary mode of Internet access. Of particular relevance to 
debates about big data-related harms is the fact that mobile applications 
have not always offered consistent access to privacy policies or privacy 
controls for information sharing.86 While certain mobile operating 
systems, such as iOS, offer simplified ways to manage location-sharing 
preferences within certain apps and tools to limit ad tracking, granular 
application settings to control other forms of in-app content sharing vary 
widely. In some cases—particularly with older versions of social media 
applications—a user must navigate to the website associated with a given 
app in order to change default settings.87 Some applications automatically 
opt-in users to higher levels of sharing than they may be aware of or 
change the terms of service to retroactively apply to content that users had 
previously posted to the platform.88  
 
 
 85.  Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., Unique in the Crowd: The Privacy Bounds of Human 
Mobility, 3 SCI. REPS. 1 (2013) (noting that Apple’s privacy policy allows the sharing of users’ 
location data with “partners and licensees” and estimating that geo-location data for roughly half of all 
iOS and Android traffic is made available to advertising networks). 
 86.  See, e.g., FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, MOBILE APPS STUDY (2012) (finding that just over 
half (53%) of the seventy-five paid apps reviewed for the study provided users access to a privacy 
policy).  
 87.  This was the case with older versions of the Facebook mobile app, which did not have the 
inline audience selector. Changing the audience for the content shared on these older versions of the 
app requires users to navigate on the website to specific settings for “old versions of Facebook for 
mobile.” See How Do I Set the Audience When I’m Using an Older Version of Facebook for Mobile 
That Doesn’t Have an Audience Selector?, FACEBOOK,  https://www.facebook.com/help/2602766939 
97558/?ref=u2u. 
 88.  One recent example that surprised social media users was Snapchat’s retroactive changes 
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Many third-party mobile applications have been shown to access more 
data than is necessary for the application to function.89 And some mobile 
applications have been shown to embed software that can surreptitiously 
perform other functions, such as monitoring a device’s microphone 
without a user’s permission.90 
There have also been notable security-related vulnerabilities associated 
with the operating systems on mobile devices. In 2013, the ACLU filed a 
complaint with the FTC noting that many smartphone owners were using a 
version of the Android operating system that had “known, exploitable 
security vulnerabilities for which fixes have been published by Google, 
but have not been distributed to consumers’ smartphones by the wireless 
carriers and their handset manufacturer partners.”91 These kinds of security 
vulnerabilities are likely to be especially acute for low-income groups, 
who are more likely to be “smartphone dependent” for all or most of their 
internet connectivity.92 
E. Social Media Use, Privacy-Protective Behaviors, and Confidence in 
Skills 
Lower income Internet users are modestly more likely than Internet 
users in higher income households to say they use social media such as 
Facebook, Twitter or Instagram: 81% of online adults in households 
earning less than $20,000 per year say they use social media, compared 
with 73% of online adults in households earning $20,000 or more.93 Most 
of this difference is attributable to the relative youthfulness of lower 
income Internet users, as online adults under the age of fifty are equally 
likely to use social media, regardless of income. 
However, focusing more closely on privacy-related behaviors within 
the population of social media users reveals several notable variations by 
 
 
regarding their use of user images. See Sally French, Snapchat’s New ‘Scary’ Privacy Policy Has Left 
Users Outraged, MARKETWATCH (Nov. 2, 2015, 4:13 PM). http://www.marketwatch.com/story/ 
snapchats-new-scary-privacy-policy-has-left-users-outraged-2015-10–29. 
 89.  See, e.g., What They Know–Mobile, WALL ST. J. (APR. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/LWK3-
P7DC; Apps Permissions in the Google Play Store, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 10, 2015), https://perma.cc 
/TEU8-E28T. 
 90.  See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Issues Warning Letters to App Developers 
Using ‘Silverpush’ Code (Mar. 17, 2016), available at https://perma.cc/N4YK-DH2Y. 
 91.  See ACLU, supra note 37, at 1. 
 92.  Smith, supra note 36.  
 93.  This difference is modest, but statistically significant when comparing these broad groups. 
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income.94 For instance, social media users in the lowest income bracket are 
significantly less likely than higher earning groups to say they have used 
privacy settings to restrict access to the content they post online—whether 
on social media platforms or other websites. Among social media users 
living in households earning less than $20,000 per year, 65% say they 
have used privacy settings to limit who can see what they post online, 
while 79% of those in wealthier households say they have done this.95 
Some of these behaviors are also associated with lower levels of 
confidence in certain privacy-related skills and knowledge. Low-income 
social media users are less likely to feel as though they “know enough” 
about managing the privacy settings for the information they share online 
(65% vs. 77%) and are less likely to feel they have a good understanding 
of the privacy policies for the applications and websites they use (64% vs. 
74%). At the same time, low-income social media users are more likely 
than higher earning groups to feel as though it would be “somewhat” or 
“very” difficult to find tools and strategies that would help them protect 
their personal information online (25% vs. 15%). 
Low-income social media users are also less likely to engage in other 
privacy-protective strategies that may impact the way they are tracked 
online. For instance, they are less likely to say that they have avoided 
communicating online when they had sensitive information to share. 
About half (52%) report this, compared with 63% of social media users in 
wealthier households. Similarly, a smaller share of low-income social 
media users say they have set their browsers to turn off cookies or notify 
them before receiving a cookie (47% vs. 58%). 
While using privacy settings, self-censoring communications, and 
restricting the use of cookies may limit some forms of tracking and 
profiling, the kinds of social media data input that are assessed by 
algorithmic systems can also include profile information that many users 
may not realize has retroactively become publicly available, or is made 
accessible to advertisers through third-party apps. For instance, over time, 
the information that has been made public by default on networks such as 
 
 
 94.  Throughout this section, “low-income social media users” are defined as those living in 
households earning less than $20,000 per year. Comparisons are made with social media users living 
in households above that income threshold, and any differences included in the discussion are 
statistically significant. 
 95.  The question about privacy settings is not limited to social media and could include the use 
of settings for other kinds of applications, platforms, and profiles. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 95:53 
 
 
 
 
Facebook has changed considerably.96 
 
Table 2. Privacy Strategies Among Social Media Users by Income  
 
The percentage who responded “yes” to the question: “While using 
the Internet, have you ever done any of the following things?” 
  
All social 
media users 
 
Less than 
$20K 
 
$20K or 
more 
 (a) 
 
(b) (c) 
Used privacy settings to limit who can 
see what you post online 
76% 65% 79%b 
Avoided communicating online when 
you had sensitive information to share 
60% 52% 63%b 
Set your browser to turn off cookies or 
notify you before you receive a cookie 
 
56% 47% 58%b 
 
Note: Significant differences within rows are noted with superscript 
letters indicating the column to which the item should be compared. 
The differences noted here were evaluated with an independent Z-test 
for significance at the 95% confidence level. Column (a), which 
displays responses for all social media users, is not included in the 
significance testing. 
 
Source: Privacy and Security Experience of Low-Socioeconomic 
Status Populations Survey, November 18–December 23, 2015, 
including an oversample of adults living in households earning less 
than $40,000 per year. Interviews were conducted in English and 
Spanish. (Total n=3,000 US adults age 18 and older, n=1,613 for 
social media users). 
 
As Hartzog et al. notes, the current big data landscape has made it 
increasingly difficult for users to effectively restrict access to their 
personal disclosures—even when they make well-intended efforts to do 
so. 
 
 
 96.  Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte & George Loewenstein, Privacy and Human 
Behavior in the Age of Information, 347 SCI. 513 (2015), https://perma.cc/THN5-BXSE. 
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In the past, individuals have been able to roughly gauge whether 
aspects of their daily routines and personal disclosures of 
information would be safeguarded at any appropriate level of 
privacy protection by (sometimes implicitly) guessing the likelihood 
their information would be discovered or understood by third parties 
who have exploitative or undesirable interests. In the age of big 
data, however, the confidence level associated with privacy 
prognostication has decreased considerably, even when 
conscientious people exhibit due diligence.97 
The resulting environment is one in which data brokers are able to glean a 
wide array of insights—such as usernames and friend connections—from 
social media activity. The FTC’s Data Brokers report documents the 
various ways that social media data are being scraped from publicly 
available websites and combined with a wide range of other behavioral 
data to create and consumer profiles.98 These kinds of practices can affect 
consumers across the socioeconomic spectrum, but low-income 
populations have been specifically targeted for their vulnerability. As a 
Senate Commerce Committee report on data broker practices identified, 
the poor have been profiled into various “financially vulnerable” market 
segments such as “Rural and Barely Making It,” and “Fragile Families.”99 
Such lists make it possible for marketers to easily target vulnerable 
consumers for dubious financial products such as payday loans, online 
classes, or debt relief services.100  
The survey results indicate that low-income social media users also 
have a range of privacy-related concerns that are more pronounced when 
compared with higher income groups.101 Most directly related to this 
 
 
 97.  Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Big Data in Small Hands, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 81, 
84 (2013), https://perma.cc/S2G5-5NSH.  
 98.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS, supra note 57, at 13–14. 
 99.  MAJORITY STAFF OF OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS, S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, 
SCI. & TRANSP., 113TH CONG., A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY: COLLECTION, USE, AND 
SALE OF CONSUMER DATA FOR MARKETING PURPOSES 24–26 (2013) (staff report for Sen. Rockefeller 
IV, Chairman, S. Comm. of Commerce, Sci. & Transp.).  
 100.  See AARON RIEKE ET AL., UPTURN, CIVIL RIGHTS, BIG DATA, AND OUR ALGORITHMIC 
FUTURE: A SEPTEMBER 2014 REPORT ON SOCIAL JUSTICE AND TECHNOLOGY 8 (2014), https://bigdata. 
fairness.io/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/2015-04-20-Civil-Rights-Big-Data-and-Our-Algorithmic-Futu 
re-v1.2.pdf; UPTURN, LED ASTRAY: ONLINE LEAD GENERATION AND PAYDAY LOANS (2015), 
https://perma.cc/UE5J-EGMV.  
 101.  Throughout this section, “low-income social media users” will continue to be defined as 
those living in households earning less than $20,000 per year. Comparisons are made with social 
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discussion, low-income users express deeper worries about commercial 
data collection. About half (52%) say they are “very concerned” about not 
knowing what personal information is being collected about them by 
companies or how it is being used, compared with just over a third (37%) 
of more affluent social media users.  
If the poor are subject to more data collection and surveillance across 
an array of institutional interactions in their daily lives, they may 
accordingly face greater burdens and vulnerabilities associated with the 
inaccuracy of records being fed into data broker profiles. In addition, if 
they are less likely to engage in certain privacy-protective behaviors 
online, this may further link their social media activity and network 
connections to data broker profiles in ways that result in negative 
outcomes associated with increasing reliance on algorithmic decision-
making systems.  
The section that follows illustrates three case studies of emerging 
practices in using publicly available social media data to inform critical 
decisions that can affect low-status individuals’ economic mobility. Social 
media sites like Twitter, Reddit, Facebook, and Instagram are a rich trove 
of data, much of which is public. One marketer explained that “[i]f Big 
Data is the water pouring out of your faucet, then social media is the 
reservoir that stream comes from.”102 Facebook, for instance, partners with 
a variety of data-brokers, including Acxiom, DataLogix, BlueKai, Epsilon 
and Experian, to develop more detailed profiles of users combining on and 
offline information.103 These data brokers are the largest in the world and 
already boast masses of data. (Acxiom claims to have data on 700 million 
people; Epsilon a file on every American household; Datalogix “more than 
$1 trillion” in offline purchase-based data.)104 Combining these data 
sources with the information that Facebook has from online interactions 
has allowed the company to develop an ad-targeting system so 
sophisticated that it “could hypothetically serve soda ads to teenagers who 
recently purchased a soft drink at a convenience store, or diaper ads to 
parents who bought baby food at a department store.”105 In the next 
 
 
media users living in households above that income threshold. Mary Madden, supra note 77. 
 102.  Dennis Hung, The Impact of Big Data on Social Media Marketing Strategies, TECH. CO (Jan. 
22, 2016, 11:03 AM), https://tech.co/impact-big-data-social-media-marketing-strategies-2016-01. 
 103.  Marketing Partners Directory, FACEBOOK, https://perma.cc/G9EQ-845J (last visited Apr. 
2017); Alex Senemar, Facebook Partners with Shadowy ‘Data Brokers’ to Farm Your Information, 
SHERBIT (Apr. 25, 2016), https://perma.cc/5MJ2-63FF. 
 104.  Senemar, supra note 103. Also note that Datalogix is owned by Oracle Corporation. See 
Oracle and Datalogix, https://perma.cc/YR3R-82VK (last visited June 3, 2017). 
 105.  Senemar, supra note 103.  
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section, we provide three examples of how social media data use by big 
data systems could contribute to inequality and differentially harm low-
income individuals.  
 
III. CASE STUDIES AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. Employment 
1. The Use of Social Media to Determine Employability 
The use of automated assessment methods to determine 
“employability” among job candidates has become a desirable feature of 
current Applicant Tracking Systems (ATS). ATS software is designed to 
simplify the hiring process and automate the review of resumes and 
applications for employers, who sometimes face the daunting task of 
sifting through thousands (or even millions) of applicants. “Using highly 
granular data about workers’ behavior both on and off the job, 
entrepreneurs are building models that they claim can predict future job 
performance.”106 As early as 2012, industry experts claimed that the vast 
majority of Fortune 500 companies were using some kind of ATS system 
to screen candidates.107 And a recent article from HR Today suggests that 
integrating the screening of social media profiles in Applicant Tracking 
Systems is among the top trends in the field: “By integrating the recruiting 
platform with such sites as LinkedIn, Facebook, and Twitter, recruiting 
teams can post job openings to a worldwide audience, at the same time 
mining a potential applicant’s personal profile on social networks for 
deeper insights."108  
The insights gleaned from social media can serve to weed out 
candidates who, for a variety of reasons, may not be seen as the best fit for 
the job.109 These assessments can be made from a range of social media 
 
 
 106.  Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 860 
(2017). 
 107.  See Lauren Weber, Your Résumé vs. Oblivion: Inundated Companies Resort to Software to 
Sift Job Applications for Right Skills, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 4, 2012), https://perma.cc/U3LD-JVPB. 
 108.  Russ Banham, 2016 Trends in Applicant Tracking Systems, HR TODAY (Feb. 2, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/3C3T-D2AD.  
 109.  These practices are not limited to the U.S. and have created a secondary market for tools 
targeted at job candidates, such as the UK-based “Social Score” that allows applicants who have been 
rejected for a job to “see what employers see” when conducting a social media check. MY SOCIAL 
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data, including content analysis of social media posts, assessments of 
personality type from likes on a social media profile, or analysis of a 
potential employee’s network connections to measure their “social capital” 
within a certain field.110 As one CEO of a recruitment solutions provider 
notes, “[t]he knowledge and data acquired from online social practices 
allows recruiters to analyze the successes and shortcomings of candidates 
for greater relationship building.”111 In some cases, companies that provide 
ATS software offer social media background checks as a separate service 
to highlight a candidate’s shortcomings. For instance, InfoCheckUSA 
offers a “Not FCRA compliant” social media background check report for 
$24.95 that will help employers “see what kind of person you are dealing 
with” and will identify activities such as “[e]xcessive Twittering or social 
media activity while on the clock.”112 
Some companies that provide applicant tracking solutions and 
predictive analytics platforms have offered job seekers advice on 
navigating the new world of social media assessments as part of the hiring 
process. HireVue, a company that promises to help employers screen 
“200% more candidates, land 13% more top performers, reduce poor 
performer hiring by 17%, and drive turnover down by 28%,”113 published 
this note of caution for job applicants: 
Social media can be tricky with their privacy settings. Make sure 
you read through every setting and what it can and cannot filter for 
you . . . . [P]rofile pictures are public regardless of your profile page 
being private or public, so be careful with the content you post and 
make sure you understand how your posts are viewed. Social media 
can be your greatest asset or your biggest failure.114 
While the exact variables that factor into an assessment are difficult to 
uncover, some companies provide descriptions of their evaluation process 
on their websites. One such company, Social Intelligence, argues that 
employers should use their service to “[a]void legal restrictions by 
 
 
SCORE, https://perma.cc/YAX6-349C. 
 110.  See Cathy O’Neil, How Algorithms Rule our Working Lives, GUARDIAN (Sept. 1, 2016, 1:00 
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/sep/01/how-algorithms-rule-our-working-lives. 
 111.  Banham, supra note 108 (internal citation omitted).  
 112.  See Social Media Background Check, INFO CHECK USA (Apr. 2017), https://perma.cc/7N 
BX-QAE3 (last visited June 3, 2017).  
 113.  See Maximum Recruiter Revenue, HIRE VUE, https://web.archive.org/web/20150911005104/ 
http://www.hirevue.com/recruiting/. 
 114.  Emily Hatch, Applying for a Job? Don’t Be Another Social Media Failure!, HIRE VUE (Sept. 
25, 2014), https://perma.cc/5BAK-7V5R.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss1/6
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017] PRIVACY, POVERTY, AND BIG DATA 81 
 
 
 
 
 
entrusting your social media screening with trusted online private 
investigators.”115 The company claims to be the only social media 
screening company that has an endorsement from the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) and employs Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)116-
certified analysts to identify “negative behavior” through a “cyber 
investigation” that can help companies to avoid “accusations of 
discrimination.”117 FCRA is the federal statute governing credit reporting. 
However, the categories of negative content that are highlighted through 
the exemplary review on their website are hardly straightforward; for 
instance, it is unclear what kinds of statements constitute “potentially 
unlawful” behavior, “potentially violent” posts, or what qualifies as 
“racism and/or demonstrations of intolerance” or “sexually explicit 
material.” It appears to be neither a fully objective nor subjective process, 
but is presented as resulting in “accurate and dependable insight.”118 
Leaders in the HR profession have been engaged in an ongoing debate 
about the ethics of social media monitoring in various forms, but many 
companies are forging ahead with various workarounds.119 In some cases, 
recruiters are hiring self-described FCRA-compliant companies to perform 
social media background checks on their behalf.120 Researchers seeking to 
understand what filters are used to raise red flags about job candidates 
found that these indicators can include broad categories such as “At Risk 
Populations,” “Potentially Unlawful Activity,” and “Potentially Violent 
Behavior” (which includes the sub-filter of “Potentially aggressive 
verbiage”).121  
While these filters may unfairly exclude many applicants due to the 
misinterpretation or miscategorization of the content of their social media 
posts or photos, experimental research suggests that some employers may 
exclude applicants based solely on descriptive profile information such as 
 
 
 115.  Products, SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE (Apr. 2017), https://perma.cc/GK7Y-4JEN. 
 116.  For a detailed discussion of FCRA and its application to hiring, see infra Part III(A)(2)(a).   
 117.  Id.  
 118.  Products, SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE, https://perma.cc/GK7Y-4JEN (last visited June 22, 2017).  
 119.  Johnathan A. Segal & Joyce LeMay, Point/Counterpoint: Should Employers Use Social 
Media to Screen Job Applicants?, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Nov. 1, 2014),  
https://perma.cc/DL7Q-4LMZ (“After an applicant has been interviewed, his or her membership in 
many protected groups is already known. So, checking his or her LinkedIn profile or Twitter handle is 
not likely to reveal much more than HR already knows.”).  
 120.  See generally ALEX ROSENBLAT, TAMARA KNEESE & DANAH BOYD, DATA & SOC’Y 
RESEARCH INST., NETWORKED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (2014), https://perma.cc/279L-68TC. 
 121.  Id. 
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religion.122 Network information—which is made public by default across 
many social media sites—can also be used in problematic ways. While 
knowing who someone is connected to may provide valuable sourcing 
information to recruiters, it has the potential to create new forms of 
“networked discrimination” that may fall outside of current legal 
regulations, discussed below.123 Overall, algorithms used in ATS systems 
and related social media screening services can harm job applicants when 
they contain inaccurate data about individuals, when their underlying 
statistical models are inaccurate, or when the data outcomes reflect pre-
existing structural disadvantage.124 And while antidiscrimination law does 
not currently restrict economic sorting based on personality, habits, and 
character traits, all of these indicators can be revealed through mobile 
devices and social media activity.125 In addition, because low-income 
social media users are more likely than higher income users to post 
content publicly, less likely to feel they have a good understanding of 
privacy policies, and less likely to engage in certain protective strategies, 
they may inadvertently be subject to a greater range of harms when 
evaluated through the use of certain ATS tools.  
2. Legal Analysis of Applicant Tracking Systems 
There is little legal recourse from inaccurate or discriminatory 
employment screening reports due to gaps in existing laws. As boyd et al. 
have argued, there are currently no restrictions in place to protect against 
discrimination on the basis of one’s personal network, despite the fact that 
our laws ban discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national 
origin, and other protected classifications.126 Increasingly, algorithmic 
 
 
 122.  ALESSANDRO ACQUISTI & CHRISTINA FONG, AN EXPERIMENT IN HIRING DISCRIMINATION 
VIA ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2031979 (reporting that when 
researchers created two fake social media profiles indicating religious affiliation and submitted job 
applications on their behalf to over 4000 employers, the Muslim candidate received a 13% lower 
callback rate compared to the Christian candidate.). 
 123.  Rosenblat, et al., supra note 120.  
 124.  Kim, supra note 106, at 874–84 (noting that data analytics can also be used for intentional 
discrimination, but that this danger is low given that employers do not need complex algorithms to 
discriminate on the basis of highly salient characteristics).  
 125.  Peppet, supra note 25, at 125 (describing the ways in which the Internet of Things—physical 
devices embedded with digital data collection, such as fitness trackers and wireless-connected 
thermostat controls—may further magnify the proliferation of data streams being used to assess 
consumers’ potential value and risk).   
 126.  danah boyd, Karen Levy & Alice Marwick, The Networked Nature of Algorithmic 
Discrimination, in DATA & DISCRIMINATION:COLLECTED ESSAYS 54 (Seeta Pena Gangadharan & 
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means of decision-making provide new mechanisms through which 
discrimination may occur.127 
The following section analyzes the major laws governing Applicant 
Tracking Systems: the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),128 which aims 
to ensure accurate credit reports, and Title VII,129 which prohibits 
employment discrimination. The bottom line is that there are scant legal 
limits on commercial data collection, and constraints on uses of data 
outputs are minimal. Our legal system largely relies on individuals to 
police their own privacy. Since low-income people are less likely to have 
confidence in and use privacy settings, they are especially vulnerable to 
discriminatory uses of big data by employers. 
a. Fair Credit Reporting Act 
Applicant Tracking Systems qualify as consumer reporting agencies 
(CRAs), which are regulated by FCRA. FCRA was enacted in 1970 to 
promote the accuracy, fairness, and privacy of personal information 
gathered by CRAs.130 A CRA is an entity that assembles and generates 
consumer reports, which contain information “bearing on a consumer's . . . 
character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living” 
to determine the consumer’s eligibility for employment, among other 
purposes.131 CRAs must use “reasonable procedures to assure maximum 
possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about 
whom the report relates.”132 The FCRA covers CRAs that use social media 
information in their reports,133 which employment background reports 
 
 
Virginia Eubanks, eds. 2014), https://www.newamerica.org/oti/policy-papers/data-and-discrimination/.    
If the social network were used as a proxy to discriminate against a protected class such as race, this 
would violate the law, but it would be very hard to prove. See Kim supra note 106, at 884. 
 127.  See boyd, supra note 52, at 664; Kim supra note 106, at 9–10; Barocas & Selbst, supra note 
4, at 674.  
 128.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 (2012).  
 129.  See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964 § tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964). 
 130.  See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1681.  
 131.  15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1).  
 132.  15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).  
 133.  On May 9, 2011, the FTC issued a letter to a company called Social Intelligence 
Corporation, which conducts social media background screening for employers. In the letter, the FTC 
clarified that the company is a CRA because it “assembles or evaluates consumer report information 
that is furnished to third parties that use such information as a factor for establishing a consumer’s 
eligibility for employment.” Letter from Maneesha Mithal, Assoc. Dir., Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Renee 
Jackson, Counsel, Soc. Intelligence Corp. (May 9, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/closing_letters/social-intelligence-corporation/110509socialintelligenceletter.pdf. In 2012, 
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increasingly contain.134  
For their part, employers that use consumer reports must provide job 
applicants with notice and obtain applicants’ written consent.135 Of course, 
in today’s job market, consent is mostly a formality, as few prospective 
employees are in a position to withhold it. If the employer then uses the 
report to take “adverse action” against the applicant (such as a failure to 
hire), the employer must notify the applicant and provide him or her with a 
copy of the credit report and a written summary of applicant’s rights.136 
The applicant then has a short time period to identify and dispute any 
errors in the report, and upon expiration of that deadline, the employer can 
take the adverse action.137 Notably, an employer faces no FCRA liability 
for failure to hire, whether based on an accurate or inaccurate report.138   
In addition, FCRA leaves several other notable gaps. To begin with, it 
does not cover employers who gather their own information and conduct 
their own background checks, such as by checking prospective employees’ 
social media accounts or public records accessible on the Internet.139 Some 
estimates are that one-fifth to one-quarter of employers research job 
applicants themselves, using social networks and search engines.140 
 
 
the FTC came to the same conclusion with regard to Spokeo, a data broker that used social media and 
other data to create detailed personal profiles of consumers, including information such as “hobbies, 
ethnicity, religion, participation on social networking sites, and photos.” Press Release, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Spokeo to Pay $800,000 to Settle FTC Charges Company Allegedly Marketed Information 
to Employers and Recruiters in Violation of FCRA (June 12, 2012), https://perma.cc/WXG2-BBM9. 
Spokeo paid a $800,000 fine to resolve allegations that it violated FCRA “by failing to make sure that 
the information it sold would be used only for legally permissible purposes; failing to ensure the 
information was accurate; and failing to tell users of its consumer reports about their obligation under 
the FCRA.” Id. Spokeo also posted fake endorsements of its products. Id. 
 134.  Credit reports used in lending are also increasingly incorporating social network data, along 
with “exchanged messages, tagged photos, browsing habits, education, searches, and geo-spatial data 
from mobile phones.” Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, On Social Credit and the Right to 
be Unnetworked, 2016 COLUM. BUS. REV. 339, 344 (2016). 
 135.  15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2) (2012) (this disclosure and authorization must be in a separate 
document from the employment application).  
 136.  15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3). 
 137.  15 U.S.C. § 1681m(b)(2) (2012).  
 138.  Kim, supra note 106, at 900 (“Thus, fair information practice principles are unlikely to 
significantly limit employer use of data models.”). 
 139.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(2)(A)(i) (2012); see also Peppet, supra note 25, at 128; Amy 
Schmitz, Secret Consumer Scores and Segmentations: Separating Consumer “Haves” from “Have-
Nots,” 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1411, 1426 (2014). 
 140.  Alexander Reicher, The Background of Our Being: Internet Background Checks in the 
Hiring Process, 28 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 115, 116 (2013). The FCRA similarly excludes information 
about “transactions or experiences between the consumer and the person making the report.” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681a(d)(2)(A)(i) (such as information provided by the applicant through a drug test or breathalyzer 
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Furthermore, many furnishers (entities that provide information to CRAs) 
and CRAs evade the FCRA by claiming not to be engaged in consumer 
reporting.141   
The FTC, which is the primary enforcer of FCRA and privacy law in 
general, is sensitive to the big data risks faced by low-income consumers 
and job applicants, but does not have the staff or budget to investigate all 
these companies.142 The Consumer Financial Protection Board (CFPB) 
was recently empowered by Congress to enforce FCRA and has flexed its 
muscles, particularly with regard to the legal responsibilities of 
furnishers.143 Still, the CFPB is a controversial agency, and its 
enforcement agenda will likely depend on the prevailing political winds.144 
The agency is currently facing a constitutional challenge regarding its 
structure.145 
The cases the FTC has successfully resolved demonstrate that even 
 
 
test). 
 141.  Kimani Paul-Emile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-Offender Status, and 
Employment Discrimination in the Information Age, 100 VA. L. REV. 893, 917 (2014). 
 142.  Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Harzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 
COLUM. L. REV. 583, 600–02 (2014) [hereinafter The New Common Law]. Under Section 5 of the FTC 
Act, a one-hundred-year-old consumer protection law that far predates the rise of the Internet, the FTC 
can challenge businesses that engage in “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce.” Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). For instance, 
under this authority, the FTC has gone after companies that violated their posted privacy policies and 
companies that altered privacy policies without consumer consent, as well as companies that failed to 
use reasonable and appropriate security practices to safeguard personal information. Solove & 
Hartzog, The New Common Law, supra 142, at 628–43 (cataloguing FTC actions finding unfair and 
deceptive practices). Several of these actions have resulted in consent orders, which have created a 
form of common law setting forth best practices regarding data use. Id. at 607. However, the FTC’s 
resource limitations and its cautious approach to regulating consumer data privacy make alternate 
vehicles of enforcement essential. See Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel Solove, The Scope and Potential of 
FTC Data Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230 (2015). Overall, “the FTC’s role is largely to 
discourage bad behavior, not to compensate affected parties.” Id. at 2294.   
 143.  Andrew M. Smith & Peter Gilbert, Fair Credit Reporting Act and Financial Update–2015, 
71 BUS. LAW 661, 664–67 (2016). The CFPB was created by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) (2012), in response to the financial crisis of 2008 and 
officially became operational in 2011. See generally Leonard J. Kennedy, Patricia A. McCoy & Ethan 
Bernstein, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for the Twenty-First 
Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1141 (2012) (giving account of CFB’s history and scope of authority).  
 144.  Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 341–42, 364–69 (20113).    
 145.  PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding the 
agency’s structure unconstitutional and making the Director removable by the President at will). This 
judgment was later vacated in PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, No. 15-1177, 2017 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 2733 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017), and the case was heard en banc on May 24, 2017.   
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supposedly reputable CRAs often violate the law. For instance, the FTC 
sued HireRight, a company that provides criminal background checks to 
large companies like Monster and Oracle, for violations such as failing to 
provide adverse action notices, failing to conduct investigations of 
disputed information, and inaccurate reporting.146 HireRight settled the 
case for $2.6 million.147 Likewise, the CFPB brought enforcement actions 
against two of the largest employment background screening providers, 
which generate more than ten million reports a year, because the reports 
contained impermissible information and widespread inaccuracies.148 For 
instance, the reports “included criminal records attached to the wrong 
consumers, dismissed and expunged records, and misdemeanors reported 
as felony convictions.”149 Under the consent order, the companies agreed 
to pay $10.5 million in damages to consumers and a penalty of $2.5 
million.150 Such blatant violations suggest that these practices may be 
widespread within the industry. 
Another stumbling block to enforcement is that most people do not 
know what information CRAs are reporting about them.151 Furthermore, it 
is nearly impossible to know how credit scoring algorithms work because 
data brokers consider this information a trade secret.152 While data 
analytics is touted for its ability to reduce human biases, it often merely 
replicates them.153 “Relying on data models instead of human decision-
making is unlikely to counter structural forms of bias, because these 
models take existing workplace structures as givens.”154 Algorithms can 
unwittingly import biases encoded by software engineers without any 
 
 
 146.  Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Employment Background Screening Company to Pay 
$2.6 Million Penalty for Multiple Violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act: FTC Charges HireRight 
Solutions Incorrectly Listed Criminal Convictions on Reports of Some Consumers (Aug. 8, 2012), 
https://perma.cc/8MR4-AMMM. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Takes Action Against Two of the Largest 
Employment Background Screening Report Providers for Serious Inaccuracies (Oct. 29, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/3AQG-KZYE. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id.; Consent Order, Consumer Protection Financial Bureau, In the Matter of General 
Information Services, Inc. and e-Background Checks.com, Inc., File No. 2015-CFPB-0028 (2015). 
 151.  See Paul-Emile, supra note 141, at 926.  
 152.  Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated 
Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2014).   
 153.  Kim, supra note 106, at 865.   
 154.  Id. at 16. (“[But] data can be a useful tool for diagnosing both cognitive and structural forms 
of bias”). 
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outside check on that process.155 Perhaps most importantly for the case of 
big data analytics, while the FCRA is aimed at ensuring accurate 
information, it does not protect job applicants from inaccurate inferences 
that are drawn from that information.156 In addition, the assessments 
covered by the FCRA are limited to determinations made about an 
individual; however, many data-driven scoring tools skirt these boundaries 
by making household-level assessments.157   
Even if a consumer is aware that she has been denied employment due 
to inaccurate information, the process to correct that information is 
ineffective for most and favors those who are wealthy and well-
connected.158 Consumers must use an online system that typically results 
in a form response,159 a system some have referred to as a “Kafkaesque no 
man's land,” 160 that more often than not fails to resolve the problem.161   
This is troubling given the high error rates in credit reports.162 The FTC 
reported that one in five credit reports contains errors, and overall, 5% of 
reports have errors that could result in a denial of credit.163 Error rates are 
similarly high with regard to CRAs’ criminal history reporting, which is 
plagued with false positive and false negative identifications, the reporting 
 
 
 155.  Id. at 14; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 152, at 14 (“Credit bureaus may be laundering 
discrimination into black-boxed scores, which are immune from scrutiny.”) (footnote omitted).  
 156.  Peppet, supra note 25, at 128.   
 157.  ROBINSON + YU, KNOWING THE SCORE: NEW DATA, UNDERWRITING, AND MARKETING IN 
THE CONSUMER CREDIT MARKETPLACE 2 (2014), https://perma.cc/8B4H-76TT (“To avoid regulatory 
limits, credit bureaus sell slightly aggregated information, such as the financial circumstances of a 
household, rather than an individual. This data can be used to target products to groups of consumers 
with great precision, based on the financial health of their household or neighborhood.”). 
 158.  Tara Siegel Bernard, Credit Error? It Pays to Be on V.I.P. List, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2011, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/your-money/credit-scores/15credit.html.   
 159.  Chi Chi Wu, Automated Injustice: How a Mechanized Dispute System Frustrates Consumers 
Seeking to Fix Errors in Their Credit Reports, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 139, 157-61 (2010).  
 160.  Bernard, supra note 158. 
 161.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 319 OF THE FAIR AND 
ACCURATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT OF 2003 21 (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ 
documents/reports/section-319-fair-accurate-credit-transactions-act-2003-sixth-interim-final-report-
federal-trade/150121factareport.pdf. 
 162.  Maureen Mahoney, Errors and Gotchas: How Credit Report Errors and Unreliable Credit 
Scores Hurt Consumers, CONSUMERS UNION 7–12 (Apr. 9, 2014), https://perma.cc/6PBP-PPWY 
(describing errors due to mining together records for different people who share similar identification, 
stale information, inaccurate information, and identity theft).  
 163.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 319 OF THE FAIR AND 
ACCURATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT OF 2003 iv-vi (2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/reports/section-319-fair-and-accurate-credit-transactions-act-2003-fifth-interim-federal-tra 
de-commission/130211factareport.pdf. 
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of expunged and sealed information, and other similar errors.164  
Furthermore, litigation brought against CRAs to challenge the accuracy 
of their reporting faces an uphill struggle, given that courts have 
interpreted the accuracy provision in FCRA as requiring “only that the 
consumer reporting agency must follow reasonable procedures to assure” 
accuracy.165 In short, the burden on CRAs to be accurate is minimal.166 
Even the most accurate consumer report could contain information 
gathered about an individual from social media posts by themselves and 
their networks. This information may be “accurately” reported by a CRA, 
but subject to devastating and incorrect inferences by employers. 
Private enforcement is barred altogether for certain FCRA protections. 
For instance, private litigants cannot sue furnishers for reporting 
inaccurate information about them.167 Rather, consumers can only sue a 
furnisher for failing to conduct an investigation.168 In addition, Congress 
barred private rights of action to enforce employer (and other end users of 
consumer reports) obligations to provide adverse action notices.169 
 
 
 164.  Paul-Emile, supra note 141, at 908. On the range of data inaccuracies associated with 
information technology, see Elizabeth D. De Armond, Frothy Chaos: Modern Data Warehousing and 
Old-Fashioned Defamation, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1061, 1075–89 (2007). 
 165.  Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 37, 42 (D.C. Cir. 1984). For a summary of the 
range of court interpretations on the “maximum possible accuracy requirement,” see Elizabeth Doyle 
O’Brien, Comment, Minimizing the Risk of the Undeserved Scarlet Letter: An Urgent Call to Amend § 
1681E(B) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 1217, 1227–36 (2008).   
 166.  Lawsuits challenging companies’ technical violations, such as a failure to provide separate 
disclosure and authorization forms, have fared much better. See Roy Maurer, Know Before You Hire:  
2016 Employment Screening Trends, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Jan. 20, 2016), 
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/talent-acquisition/pages/2016-employment-
screening-trends.aspx. According to reports, class actions settled in 2015 included cases against BMW, 
Calvin Klein, Chuck E. Cheese, Food Lion, Home Depot, and Whole Foods, with settlements ranging 
from $716,000 to $3 million. See David N. Anthony & Julie D. Hoffmeister, The Fair Credit 
Reporting Act: Not Just About Credit, BUS. L. TODAY (June 2016), https://www.americanbar.org/ 
publications/blt/2016/06/13_anthony.html; Thomas Ahearn, Class Action Lawsuits Will Continue to 
Increase in Target Rich Background Screening Environment in 2016, EMPLOYMENT SCREENING 
RESOURCES, Dec. 28, 2015, http://www.esrcheck.com/wordpress/2015/12/28/fcra-lawsuits-will-
continue-to-increase-in-target-rich-background-screening-environment-in-2016/.  
 167.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1681s-2(c)(1), (d) (2012); Hopson v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 14 F. Supp. 3d 
774, 789–90 (S.D. Miss. 2014); Stafford v. Cross Country Bank, 262 F. Supp. 2d 776, 782–83 (W.D. 
Ky. 2003) (holding that furnishers can be sued by private consumers only for failure to properly 
investigate a consumer’s dispute transmitted by a CRA). 
 168.  15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b).  
 169.  15 U.S.C. § 1681m(h)(8) (an employer is required to notify a rejected applicant after taking 
the adverse action and the notice should contain contact information of the CRA informing the 
applicant of their rights to dispute the accuracy of the report). On the barriers to private enforcement, 
see Alexandra P. Everhart Sickler, The (Un)fair Credit Reporting Act, 28 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 
238, 256, 265–80 (2016). 
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Furthermore, state tort law does not fill the gap because the FCRA 
preempts most state law claims.170 Thus, a consumer has limited recourse 
for a FCRA violation tied to use of an ATS report.171   
b. Employment Discrimination Law 
Under federal law, employers cannot discriminate on the basis of race, 
color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, age (over forty), genetic 
information, or military service.172 If an employer uses an ATS report to 
draw inferences about an applicant’s protected characteristics and then 
denies them employment, it might be charged with disparate treatment.173 
Or, if the algorithms underlying ATS generate hiring recommendations 
that disfavor protected groups, applicants might have a claim for disparate 
impact.174 These are the two main forms of legally cognizable employment 
discrimination.175 Yet as explained below, the algorithmic nature of the 
data mining that underlies ATS is unlikely to result in a successful lawsuit 
under either theory176—even though big data can “reproduce existing 
patterns of discrimination, inherit the prejudice of prior decision-makers, 
or simply reflect the widespread biases that persist in society.”177   
 
 
 170.  15 U.S.C. 1681h(e). See generally Elizabeth D. De Armond, A Dearth of Remedies, 113 
PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (2008).   
 171.  Class action plaintiffs’ lawyers have had success suing companies for technical violations of 
FCRA, unrelated to the accuracy of information, such as failure to use a standalone disclosure form. 
See Anthony & Hoffmeister, supra note 166, at 2. But see Just v. Target Corp., 187 F. Supp. 3d 1064 
(D. Minn. 2016) (rejecting FCRA class action because employer conduct was not willful). However, 
these suits may falter in light of the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Spokeo v. Robins, holding that 
plaintiffs must establish an injury in fact that is both concrete and particularized. 136 S. Ct. 1540 
(2016). A pure statutory violation with no other impacts may not meet this standard.  
 172.  42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. For an overview of Title VII protections, see Robert Sprague, 
Welcome to the Machine: Privacy and Workplace Implications of Predictive Analytics, 21 RICH. J.L. & 
TECH. 12, 13, 35 (2015).    
 173.  For a recent court discussion on disparate treatment, see Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2015). 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  For a clear and recent explanation of the standards used to prove the different employment 
discrimination causes of action, see generally Deborah L. Brake, The Shifting Sands of Employment 
Discrimination: From Unjustified Impact to Disparate Treatment in Pregnancy and Pay, 105 GEO. 
L.J. 559 (2017). 
 176.  Kim, supra note 106, at 866 (arguing that the disparate impact provision of Title VII should 
be interpreted and used to combat what she terms “classification bias,” or employer reliance on “data 
algorithms, to sort or score workers in ways that worsen inequality or disadvantage along the lines of 
race, sex, or other protected characteristics.”).  
 177.  Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 673–74. 
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An employer would clearly be engaging in disparate treatment if it 
used ATS reports as a mask to engage in forbidden discrimination.178 Even 
if ATS reports scrub out references to protected characteristics, which is 
one of their selling points as a way to reduce employers’ legal liability,179 
other variables in the report could serve as proxies for identifying group 
memberships. While this is certainly possible, employers are unlikely to 
use ATS as a cover for intentional discrimination. As Barocas and Selbst 
explain, “most cases of employment discrimination are already sufficiently 
difficult to prove; employers motivated by conscious prejudice would have 
little to gain by pursuing these complex and costly [data mining] 
mechanisms to further mask their intentions.”180 Even if an employer were 
purposefully discriminating, disparate treatment cases are hard to win, 
especially without a smoking gun, such as an employer’s discriminatory 
comments. One would search in vain for a smoking gun in ATS reports, 
because “these models simply mine the available data, looking for 
statistical correlations that connect seemingly unrelated variables, such as 
patterns of social media behavior, with workplace performance.”181 
Accordingly, ATS reports are more likely to reflect or foster implicit bias, 
through which unconscious stereotypes are used to make decisions. 
Although scholars have crafted compelling theories for finding implicit 
bias liability,182 courts are very wary of recognizing this “second 
generation” form of discrimination. Instead, they are looking for bad 
actors with intentional animus.183 Other data mining dangers are similarly 
devoid of conscious intent—such as erroneous data or replication of 
structural biases embedded within the workplace—and thus fail to meet 
the courts’ demands.184   
Because ATS use is unlikely to trigger conscious discrimination, 
disparate impact doctrine appears a better fit, but it is similarly constrained 
as a remedy. Under Title VII, an employer cannot use facially neutral 
policies or practices that have a disparate impact on a protected class, 
unless those policies or practices are justified by a legitimate business 
 
 
 178.  Kim, supra note 106, at 884–85. 
 179.  Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 714.   
 180.  Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 693 (footnote omitted).   
 181.  Kim, supra note 106, at 866. 
 182.  See generally e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Employment Discrimination 
Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997 (2006); Susan Sturm, Second 
Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001). 
 183.  Brake, supra note 175, at 570–74.   
 184.  Kim, supra note 106, at 887.  
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need that cannot be reasonably achieved by other means.185 Even in the 
absence of big data, disparate impact cases are notoriously hard to win due 
to the complexity and expense of obtaining the necessary statistical 
evidence to demonstrate a disparate impact,186 judicial biases against 
employment plaintiffs and a concomitant belief that discrimination is a 
relic of the past, a lack of understanding about how unconscious bias 
works,187 and courts’ willingness to accept employers’ proffered 
justifications for business necessity.188   
When big data is added to the mix, as Barocas and Selbst have pointed 
out, disparate impact is particularly difficult to establish.189 This is because 
courts approve of employer hiring criteria that are job related, and 
computer models have the benefit of accessing massive amounts of data 
that are highly predictive of future performance.190 Moreover, much data 
collection and mining incorporates unconscious biases that are baked into 
current structural disparities, making it hard for plaintiffs to identify 
alternative employment practices that achieve the same goals while being 
less discriminatory, as Title VII requires.191  
 
 
 185.  This framework was established in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The 
Supreme Court held that Title VII prohibits not only intentional discrimination, but also practices and 
policies that have a discriminatory impact upon employees. Id. The Court struck down an employer’s 
job requirement for high school diplomas and certain test scores because there was an adverse impact 
on African-Americans and the requirements were not necessary to perform the power plant jobs at 
issue. Id.  
 186.  See Sprague, supra note 172, at 40; Paul-Emile, supra note 141, at 926 (“[T]he fact 
that criminal records discrimination occurs almost exclusively during the hiring stage makes it difficult 
for an aggrieved applicant to acquire the empirical data necessary to show how the employer has 
treated similarly situated applicants.”).  
 187.  Disparate impact theory struggles to accommodate implicit bias claims because the legal 
standard focuses on a neutral employer policy, and thus fails “to consider the role of the individual 
decision-maker whose discrimination led to an adverse employment action.” Audrey J. Lee, 
Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 481, 
491 (2005). 
 188.  See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 
706 (2006); Michael Selmi, Why are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. 
REV. 555, 561–62 (2001); Ann C. McGinley, Ricci v. DeStefano: Diluting Disparate Impact and 
Redefining Disparate Treatment, 12 NEV. L.J. 626 (2001); Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History 
of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 257 (2011); Barocas & Selbst, supra note 
4, at 707 (“[C]ourts tend to accept most common business practices for which an employer has a 
plausible story.”).   
 189.  Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 707–12 (describing the multiple hurdles for raising a 
disparate impact claim in the context of big data). 
 190.  Id. at 707–08. 
 191.  Id. at 710–11.     
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The challenges of establishing disparate impact claims are seen with 
regard to credit checks and criminal records—both of which may be part 
of ATS reports—but which also have longer histories as standalone pre-
employment screening tools. Poor credit and criminal records are more 
prevalent in minority communities than among whites, thus their use has 
an adverse impact on the hiring of minorities.192 Disparities in credit 
particularly impact African-Americans and result from historic patterns of 
discrimination that have created a racial wealth gap, as well as predatory 
lending practices targeting minority communities.193 Similar disparities 
plague minorities with regard to criminal records, as a result of 
disproportionate policing and arrests in minority communities.194 At the 
same time, studies do not find a predictive connection between these 
personal characteristics and job performance for most jobs.195 
Accordingly, civil rights groups have advocated against the use of both 
these criteria in hiring. 196 
In 2012, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
issued guidance seeking to reduce the disparate impact of criminal 
background checks upon minorities197 (the EEOC has not issued 
guidelines with regard to credit checks).198 The criminal background check 
guidelines assert that it is unlawful for employers to adopt blanket no-hire 
policies for people with criminal backgrounds.199 Instead, the EEOC 
advises employers to conduct individualized assessments of job candidates 
with criminal backgrounds prior to excluding them from a position. The 
 
 
 192.  With regard to credit checks, see Pooja Shethji, Note, Credit Checks Under Title VII: 
Learning from the Criminal Background Check Context, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 989, 997–1002 (2016). 
Half of employers conduct credit checks in hiring. Id. at 991. With regard to criminal background 
checks, see Paul-Emile, supra note 141, 894–97; PERSIS S. YU & SHARON M. DIETRICH, NAT’L 
CONSUMER LAW CTR., BROKEN RECORDS: HOW ERRORS BY CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKING 
COMPANIES HARM WORKERS AND BUSINESSES (2012), https://perma.cc/WQM7-TS83.  
 193.  AMY TRAUB, DEMOS, DISCREDITED: HOW EMPLOYMENT CREDIT CHECKS KEEP QUALIFIED 
WORKERS OUT OF A JOB 7, 9 (2013), https://perma.cc/V9AD-G5L5.  
 194.  See Paul-Emile, supra note 141, at 910–15.  
 195.  Id. at 895 (criminal background checks); Shethji, supra note 192, at 991 (credit checks). 
 196.  See, e.g., Lydell Bridgeford, Q&A: Hiring Practices on the NAACP Legal Defense Fund’s 
Radar, BNA LAB. AND EMP. BLOG, Apr. 8, 2013, https://www.bna.com/qa-hiring-practices-
b17179873189/. The “ban the box” movement advocates against required criminal background 
disclosures in job applications. See Dallan F. Flake, When Any Sentence is a Life Sentence:  
Employment Discrimination Against Ex-Offenders, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 45, 92-95 (2015). 
 197.  U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NO. 915.002 EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: 
CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE 
VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (2012), https://perma.cc/Q4DN-DNZQ.  
 198.  See Shethji, supra note 192, at 992. 
 199.  See supra note 197.  
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guidance generated an immediate backlash from the business community, 
which complained about the “catch-22” of conducting criminal 
background checks and being held in violation of Title VII or failing to 
conduct a check and being held liable for negligent hiring.200 Regardless of 
the merits of the guidance, subsequent EEOC disparate impact litigation 
based on credit and criminal background checks has faltered, as courts 
have found the plaintiff’s proof inadequate.201 At bottom, courts may be 
concerned about their role in remedying the complexities of societal 
discrimination that precede and extend far beyond an employer’s decision 
to conduct a criminal background or credit check. Such reluctance is likely 
to plague evaluations of ATS systems, which aggregate multiple sources 
of data and thus attenuate the employer’s responsibility for the patterns 
that emerge. 
Social network data muddies the waters even more. Recently, some 
credit reporting companies have begun gleaning data from social media 
networks, thereby impacting the credit rating not only of the person 
subject to the report, but also the credit of third parties within that person’s 
networks.202 In other words, everyone’s creditworthiness is impacting the 
entire network. Because ATS evaluations typically include credit 
information, it may be sweeping in these relational inferences from credit 
check companies, as well as generating them directly from social 
networks. This dynamic, in which social networks generate inferences 
about a person’s job worthiness, raises the theoretical potential of 
associational discrimination claims under Title VII.203 Under this theory, 
 
 
 200.  HANS VON SPAKOVSKY, HERITAGE FOUND., THE DANGEROUS IMPACT OF 
BARRING CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS: CONGRESS NEEDS TO OVERRULE THE EEOC’S 
NEW EMPLOYMENT “GUIDELINES” (2012), https://perma.cc/T5UV-LJMG; John D. Bible, To Check or 
Not to Check: New EEOC Enforcement Guidance on the Use of Criminal History Information in 
Making Hiring Decisions, BUS. L. TODAY, MAR. 2013, https://www.americanbar.org/publications/ 
blt/2013/03/05_bible.html. 
 201.  See, e.g., EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 748 F.3d 749 (6th Cir. 2014) (rejecting a 
disparate impact challenge to employer use of credit histories in hiring); EEOC v. Freeman, 961 F. 
Supp. 2d 783, 789 (D. Md. 2013), aff’d, 778 F.3d 463 (4th Cir. 2015) (rejecting a disparate impact 
challenge to employer use of criminal background checks). 
 202.  Packin & Lev-Aretz, supra note 134, at 386. 
 203.  While Title VII does not directly address this theory one way or the other, the Americans 
with Disabilities Act expressly forbids associational discrimination, meaning that an employee cannot 
be discriminated against for having an association with a person with a known disability. 42 U.S.C. § 
12112(b)(4) (2012). The EEOC explains: “The purpose of the association provision is to prevent 
employers from taking adverse actions based on unfounded stereotypes and assumptions about 
individuals who associate with people who have disabilities.” Questions and Answers About the 
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courts have recognized disparate treatment claims brought by plaintiffs 
whose employers took adverse actions against them because they had 
relationships with persons of another race or national origin.204 For 
instance, courts have applied associational discrimination to cases in 
which a white man claimed he was not hired due to his marriage to a black 
woman,205 a white woman asserted her employer refused to renew her 
contract because she associated with “Spanish citizens,”206 and a white 
man alleged discriminatory discharge for having a biracial daughter.207 As 
one court explained, “where an employee is subjected to adverse action 
because an employer disapproves of interracial association, the employee 
suffers discrimination because of the employee’s own race.”208 These 
cases support the principle that employees should be able to associate with 
people of their own choosing without employers drawing negative 
conclusions from those relationships.   
Big data discrimination may run afoul of this principle. Yet, despite its 
theoretical appeal, there are practical barriers to associational 
discrimination claims in the big data context. To begin with, successful 
associational discrimination cases involve intentional acts by employers 
motivated by conscious bias, and are thus framed as disparate treatment 
claims. By contrast, big data discrimination is likely to be unintentional, as 
data mining involves statistical correlations that do not require conscious 
efforts to target specific groups. Thus, it would be difficult, if not 
 
 
Association Provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N (Feb. 2, 2011), https://perma.cc/Z8GY-M64K.  
 204.  See Victoria Schwartz, Title VII: A Shift from Sex to Relationships, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 
209, 215–32 (2012) (summarizing the theory and cases); see also Matthew Clark, Stating a Title VII 
Claim for Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Workplace: The Legal Theories Available After 
Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, 51 UCLA L. REV. 313, 329 (2003). 
 205.  Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 206.  Reiter v. Ctr. Consol. School Dist., 618 F. Supp. 1458, 1459 (D. Colo. 1985). 
 207.  See Tetro v. Elliot Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick & GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 988, 
994 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Gresham v. Waffle House, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1442, 1445 (N.D. Ga. 1984) 
(a white woman asserted she was fired due to her marriage to a black man); Barrett v. Whirlpool 
Corp., 543 F. Supp. 2d 812, 826 (M.D. Tenn. 2008) (a white woman claimed she suffered a hostile 
work environment due to her friendship with an African-American male co-worker); Deffenbaugh-
Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds by, 
Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 182 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999) (a white plaintiff claimed she was 
discharged due to her dating and marriage to a black person); Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 
132 (2d Cir. 2008) (white basketball coach claimed discriminatory discharge based on his marriage to 
a black woman). The EEOC has applied the theory to sexual orientation discrimination as well. 
Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/L8Q6-XHYC.  
 208.  Holcomb, 521 F.3d at 139. 
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impossible, to ascertain the role that any specific social network data 
played in an ATS report that generated conclusions about a potential 
employee’s likely job performance or tenure or other job-related 
characteristic. Job applicants would not explicitly be turned away from 
jobs because employers do not approve of their online friends. Rather, 
algorithms may conclude that the applicant’s friends have characteristics 
that bear on the applicant’s own suitability for the job. This is potentially 
problematic, but it does not fit within the current associational 
discrimination paradigm. 
Discrimination law is also not a promising avenue when it comes to 
discrimination against the poor, whether intentional or unconscious. 
Employment law simply does not extend to discrimination on the basis of 
social class, even though decisions based on social media searches might 
“further disadvantage the poor by subjecting them to the negative 
judgments of those who control important resources[,]” such as 
employers.209 For instance, obesity and smoking are more prevalent in 
low-income communities, and social media that reveals these traits may 
result in reputational harm that limits opportunities.210 Certain clothing 
styles or social behaviors are also associated with poor communities and 
operate as signals of social class.211 This is problematic because poverty 
carries social stigma in America—our governing ideology blames poverty 
on individual moral failings rather than structural dislocations in the 
economy.212 Yet even intentional discrimination against the poor is 
perfectly legal and ATS will likely capture these indicia of poverty. Thus, 
these networked inferences, when implemented widely and without 
recourse, risk further dampening social mobility and trapping individuals 
in unemployment or low-wage employment.   
B. Higher Education 
1. Big Data Tools Impacting Access to Higher Education  
Education is often cited as one of the primary pathways out of poverty, 
but increasingly, the online behavior of low-income applicants may 
 
 
 209.  Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L. Rustad, Digital Scarlet Letters: Social Media 
Stigmatization of the Poor and What Can Be Done, 93 NEB. L. REV. 592, 611 (2015).   
 210.  Id. at 600–01. 
 211.  Id. at 595.   
 212.  Id. at 598. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
96 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 95:53 
 
 
 
 
influence whether or not they are recruited for or ultimately gain entrance 
to college. Big-data driven insights are being used to help create 
efficiencies at various stages in the college admissions lifecycle, from 
marketing and recruitment to selection and retention. Some of these efforts 
are intended to reduce economic inequalities in access to higher education. 
For instance, in order to more effectively target college marketing 
materials to high-achieving, low-income students, certain institutions are 
using large-scale datasets to provide customized recommendations of 
“high-quality colleges and universities” for students who are likely to be 
admitted based on their previous academic performance.213  
Other efforts are more focused on improving the admissions decision-
making process and increasing graduation rates. As colleges increasingly 
look for ways to differentiate students, some are using predictive modeling 
tools that consider a wide range of factors beyond traditional application 
materials, such as how many friends and photos they have on social media 
platforms.214 
The general practice of reviewing applicants’ social media profiles is 
becoming more common among admissions officers. A recent Kaplan Test 
Prep survey of close to 400 college admissions officers across the United 
States found that 40% of admissions officers now say they visit applicants’ 
social media pages to learn more about them, up from 10% in 2008.215 
Yet, the Kaplan questions measure a fairly basic form of checking up on 
students’ digital footprints that still requires a certain level of judgment 
and discretion on the part of the reviewer. By contrast, when a student’s 
social media data are fed into a third-party predictive analytics system, the 
reviewer may not understand what variables are factoring into a student’s 
score or how each one is weighted and why.  
This raises a number of ethical questions regarding the fairness, 
accuracy and transparency of this process: How can admissions staff be 
certain that a system has captured the correct social media profile for an 
applicant? How do these systems evaluate the value of a student’s online 
network and interactions? Should a student be held liable for the way their 
extended family members or friends or other connections behave on social 
 
 
 213.  Ben Castleman, Big Data, Meet Behavioral Science, BROOKINGS (Mar. 10, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/G2D2-QZQH. 
 214.  Emmanuel Felton, Colleges Shift to Using ‘Big Data’—Including from Social Media—in 
Admissions Decisions, HECHINGER REP. (Aug. 21, 2015), https://perma.cc/428S-QJLR. 
 215.  Press Release, Kaplan, Kaplan Test Prep Survey: Percentage of College Admissions Officers 
Who Check Out Applicants’ Social Media Profiles Hits New High; Triggers Include Special Talents, 
Competitive Sabotage (Jan. 13, 2016), https://perma.cc/TJ74-B3WR.  
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media? And how does the absence of a social media footprint (if one 
chooses to opt-out or restrict content) affect one’s standing?  
Even as these systems strive to create a better fit between prospective 
students and their schools, there can also be strong economic incentives 
driving the adoption of predictive modeling tools. The higher “yield” (i.e., 
demand) that a school can demonstrate to its creditors, the more it can save 
in reduced interest rates and improve overall rankings in lists such as the 
U.S. News and World Report ratings for universities.216 IBM, one of the 
leading providers of big data-driven assessment tools for higher education, 
describes the social media value proposition as follows: 
Analyzing social media engagements not only provides insight on a 
candidate’s personal interests, but, over time, analysis can also 
determine the behaviors of those who are likely to enroll and 
complete a degree program. Social media monitoring platforms 
generate real-time insights on content type and photos posted by 
current students and alumni, which can lead to a better idea of the 
kind of social media behavior to look for in a pool of candidates. In 
addition to peer interaction on their personal social media accounts, 
a candidate’s interaction on a university’s social media channels can 
be of interest to an admissions officer.217 
It is unclear to what extent students realize that their social data streams 
might be fed into these kinds of assessments and how this awareness gap 
may affect different socioeconomic groups. Media reports have suggested 
that knowledge of social media monitoring by college admissions officers 
may be influencing more students to “clean up” their profiles before 
applying to college.218 However, even if a student successfully sanitizes 
his or her own profile, the aforementioned method of social media 
monitoring may also include analysis of one’s extended network of family 
and friends. Due to the networked nature of social media, that can create 
an extra layer of challenges to maintaining the kind of idealized online 
 
 
 216.  Tim Lloyd, How College Applications Change in the Era of Big Data, MARKETPLACE (Jan. 
14, 2014, 2:10 PM), https://perma.cc/C5P3-VMDV.  
 217.  Lauren Willison, 3 Ways Universities Are Leveraging Big Data Analytics for Recruitment 
and Retention, IBM BIG DATA & ANALYTICS HUB BLOG (Mar. 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/SC8U-
5XUQ.  
 218.  Natasha Singer, Toning Down the Tweets Just in Case Colleges Pry, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 
2014, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/20/technology/college-applicants-sanitize-
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presence that recruiters would like to see.  
Former FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez has referred to this type of 
data-driven decision making as “data determinism,” and cautioned that 
access to education may be one of the many areas impacted by a reliance 
on algorithmic assessments. 
Individuals may be judged not because of what they’ve done, or 
what they will do in the future, but because inferences or 
correlations drawn by algorithms suggest they may behave in ways 
that make them poor credit or insurance risks, unsuitable candidates 
for employment or admission to schools or other institutions, or 
unlikely to carry out certain functions.219 
Scholars who study the role of social media in education have raised 
concerns about the fairness of reviewing personal profiles as part of the 
admissions process, and the ways in which it might discriminate against 
those who have a lower level of proficiency in social media privacy 
management.220 As one dean of admissions, quoted in an article about big 
data-driven trends in college admissions, notes, “[t]his is the kind of stuff 
that savvy parents, students, and college counselors know about.”221 This 
begs the question: How are less savvy parents and students, and those who 
may not have regular engagement with college counselors, faring in this 
new environment? If lower-income social media users’ profiles are more 
accessible than higher-income users, and analysis of their network 
connections is more likely to reflect an entrenched set of structural 
disadvantages, then the conclusions drawn from these analyses will 
replicate those inequities. 
2. Legal Analysis of Predictive Analytics in College Admissions  
The use of predictive analytics generated from big data sources such as 
social media postings, test scores, and demographic data faces few legal 
limits. No law prohibits colleges from gathering information about 
students from social media or other publicly available information.  
With regard to the use of data, there are two main legal doctrines 
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potentially at issue: Title VI of the Civil Rights Act,222 which prohibits 
discrimination in education, and the Family Education Rights and Privacy 
Act (FERPA),223 which governs the confidentiality of student records.   
One major concern about predictive analytics in the higher education 
sphere is that minority college applicants will be disproportionately 
excluded from admissions. Colleges are looking to identify metrics of 
student retention and success,224 and the metrics they are using may 
unintentionally harm minorities. This is a problem of disparate impact, in 
which a facially neutral process has a differential impact on minority 
groups.225 The gathering and analysis of big data can look particularly 
“neutral,” given that computers do the work based on seemingly objective 
criteria. This neutrality may be a mirage, however, because software 
engineers craft code that can unintentionally embed social and cognitive 
biases into the analytics. If minorities are denied admission as a result, 
they might have a disparate impact claim under Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act (similar to the sort of claim discussed above in connection with 
employment).  
 Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the 
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”226 It covers 
almost all colleges and universities, both public and private.227 Title VI 
allows individuals to seek relief in court for intentional discrimination, but 
it does not include language barring disparate impact.228 Nevertheless, the 
Department of Education (DOE) has adopted disparate impact theory by 
issuing regulations that prohibit practices that have the “effect of” 
discriminating on the basis of race, color, or ethnicity.229 
 Only the DOE can enforce a Title VI disparate impact claim; private 
 
 
 222.  42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012). 
 223.  20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012). 
 224.  See Ry Rivard, Predicting Where Students Go, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Sept. 19, 2014), 
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 225.  See supra note 177 (describing disparate impact in the employment context). 
 226.  42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).   
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DEP’T OF EDUC., https://perma.cc/YZ3Q-5B86 (last visited June 22, 2017).  
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citizens cannot.230 A student or other individual can trigger a DOE 
investigation by filing a complaint with the DOE’s Office of Civil 
Rights.231 The test for disparate impact claims in the educational context is 
borrowed from the employment context of Title VII.232 Under this test, the 
plaintiff must first show that the practice in question results in a significant 
disparity in the provision of a benefit or service that is based on race or 
national origin.233 The burden then shifts to the college, who must 
demonstrate that the policy has a “substantial legitimate justification.”234 If 
the college meets its burden, it can still be liable if alternative practices 
exist that would meet the college’s educational goals and result in lower 
disparities.235  
Using this framework, scholars and advocates have crafted disparate 
impact theories designed to challenge the use of SAT scores as well as 
criminal background checks in admissions, both of which may 
disproportionately exclude minorities. In brief, the argument is that use of 
these data points have a disproportionately harmful impact on black and 
Hispanic students, that the data is correlated to low-income status but not 
to future success (for SATs) or unsafe behavior (for criminal background), 
and that there are less discriminatory alternatives for predicting 
educational outcomes (the college’s justification for SAT scores) and 
student safety (the justification for criminal background checks).236  
In a legal challenge to the use of the SATs in the Title IX context 
(prohibiting educational discrimination on the basis of gender), a federal 
court ruled that New York State’s exclusive reliance on SAT scores to 
 
 
 230.  Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281 (2001) (holding that the disparate impact Title VI 
regulations are not privately enforceable). For a critique of Sandoval, see Johnson, supra note 228, at 
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award merit-based college scholarships had a disparate impact on 
women.237 Similarly, the DOE’s Office of Civil Rights is currently 
investigating a Florida scholarship program that relies heavily on strict 
SAT and ACT score cut-offs as criteria and that awards most scholarships 
to white and affluent families.238 While no legal case has been brought 
testing this theory against criminal background checks, there is sustained 
advocacy in this area. In February 2016, the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil 
Rights Under Law called on the organization that administers the 
Common Application—a standardized college application form used by 
more than 600 colleges—to cease using questions about applicants’ 
educational disciplinary histories, criminal records, and juvenile justice 
backgrounds.239 In 2015, New York University announced that it would 
review applications “without awareness of whether the applicant checked 
the box” regarding past crimes, and if a student with a criminal 
background passes that stage, the decision then goes to a team of 
admissions officers “specially trained on fact-based assessment and issues 
of bias.”240 The University explained that this would strike a balance 
between educating a diverse group of students and ensuring the safety of 
the campus community.241 
Ultimately, grassroots advocacy might be the best strategy for 
challenging big data in admissions. As noted above with regard to 
employment, disparate impact cases are generally hard to win.242 To begin 
with, there is no protection for discrimination based on poverty, even 
though it is disproportionately associated with minorities. Even if any 
adverse impact of big data in admissions falls clearly on minorities (as 
opposed to poor applicants in general), a plaintiff who suspects he or she 
is a victim of disparate impact through predictive analytics would have to 
convince DOE to investigate the case. Even if DOE pursued a case, 
litigation in this area is difficult to win due to the statistical demands of 
proving disparate impact, as well as judicial deference to college 
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determinations about educational necessity.243 Further, the very theory of 
disparate impact in the educational context is highly contested given that 
the statute does not explicitly permit it. Big data makes proof of disparate 
impact even harder. The process of aggregation makes it difficult to 
identify a specific variable that is linked to a disparate impact, as courts 
require.244 As Jules Polonetsky and Omer Tene write, “the hallmark of big 
data is the escape of information from the confines of a structured database 
and the ability to harvest, analyze, rearrange, and reuse freestanding 
information.”245  
Not surprisingly then, the legal and social movements against the use 
of SATs and criminal background checks do not tackle the far murkier 
issue of how social media information is being used to make decisions 
about student admissions. Pointing to the SATs as a discriminatory culprit 
is straightforward; disentangling a predictive score generated from big 
data is more complex. Ironically, tests like the SATs were initially created 
to provide “neutral” metrics of merit in order to expand educational 
opportunities to a broader range of students,246 yet the reality is that test 
results reflect the disadvantages of test takers.247 The use of big data is 
likely to mirror this trajectory. Lower income young adults are avid social 
media users, but less likely than their higher income peers to use privacy 
settings to limit the information they share online.248 Will SAT scores and 
criminal background checks be replaced by social media and data broker 
proxies? 
It is possible that a student could uncover the variables that influenced 
his or her admissions decision using FERPA,249 which protects the 
confidentiality of student educational records. Schools that violate FERPA 
risk a loss of federal funding, although this penalty has never been 
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imposed.250 Under FERPA, students have the right to review educational 
records, request corrections, receive a hearing if the correction is denied, 
prohibit the release of personally identifiable information, and receive an 
annual notice of FERPA rights.251 However, even if a student gained 
access to their file, he or she would be hard-pressed to identify an 
underlying algorithmic variable or how it impacted the school’s decision. 
As with many digital records, there are concerns that the information 
feeding predictive analytics is not always accurate. The law provides little 
recourse. FCRA does not apply to admissions processes at educational 
institutions.252 Moreover, many colleges gather student data through 
student self-reporting or by searching for information themselves,253 thus 
taking them outside FCRA’s regulation of credit reporting. If colleges 
were subject to FCRA with regard to prospective students, they would 
have to notify applicants about a background check and obtain their 
consent, as well as notify a student before rejecting them if the decision 
were based in part on the report, and provide the student with the 
opportunity to challenge the accuracy of the report.254 Such changes would 
be a positive step for ensuring fairness in higher education admissions, but 
could face many of the limitations of FCRA in the consumer context. 
One trend in higher education that is on the FTC’s radar is the practice 
of “lead generation,” which may prey upon low-income students—
particularly those whose social media activity is readily accessible. As the 
FTC defines it, lead generation “is the practice of identifying or cultivating 
consumer interest in a product or service, and distributing this information 
to third parties.”255 The FTC notes that such leads often contain sensitive 
personal and financial information “that may travel through multiple 
online marketing entities before connecting with the desired business.”256 
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In the higher education sphere, there are websites that gather information 
about potential students and then sell the data to for-profit colleges, where 
students often assume crippling debt with few job prospects after 
graduation.257 The for-profit educational industry, in particular, targets 
low-income students.258 In April 2016, the FTC announced a settlement of 
its first enforcement action against a lead generator in the educational 
sphere.259 The FTC alleged that Gigats.com had deceived consumers into 
thinking they were being pre-screened for jobs when it was instead 
gathering information for for-profit educational schools that were paying 
for the leads.260 While transparent and truthful lead generation has the 
potential to connect low-income students to educational opportunities, 
continued FTC enforcement in this area will be important to protect 
students from deceptive practices. At the same time, lead generation seems 
to be only the tip of the iceberg in terms of potential big data disparities in 
the field of higher education. 
C. Policing 
1. The Emerging World of Threat Scores and Predictive Policing Tools 
Due to historic patterns in law enforcement, the problems that 
algorithmic decision-making (drawing on social media and Internet use) 
poses for the poor are especially acute when considering the potential 
consequences of “threat scoring” systems and other predictive policing 
tools. As noted in the May 2014 White House Report Big Data: Seizing 
Opportunities, Preserving Values, one of the more controversial features 
of new predictive policing tools is the ability to create individualized 
scores to assess a single person’s propensity for being involved in a 
crime.261 While the formulas behind proprietary analytical models are 
currently inaccessible to researchers or even the police departments who 
purchase these tools, some insights can be gleaned through analysis of 
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marketing materials associated with some of the platforms being sold for 
use in law enforcement across the United States. 
In a recent review of promotional materials and public statements 
associated with Beware, one of the controversial threat scoring tools being 
piloted in places such as Fresno, California, David Robinson noted that, 
“threat scores may reflect everything from criminal histories to social 
media activity to health-related history.”262 Rather than relying on police 
department or city records, the assessments are based on data gathered 
from commercial data brokers.263 However, it is entirely unclear—both to 
police departments and the general public—how individual variables 
being fed into these models might be weighted and what kind of threat 
they are actually measuring.264 Those who are subject to these analyses 
(which are run in response to a 911 call) are given neither any insight into 
how the data is being used, nor any ability to correct errors in cases where 
inaccurate information may result in a mistaken assessment of the 
individual.265 
With many different data streams feeding into these models, there are 
myriad opportunities for problems associated with information quality and 
accuracy. In one widely reported anecdote, Fresno, California councilman 
Clinton J. Olivier asked to have his threat score run by the Beware system 
at a local hearing last November, the tool returned a threat level of 
“yellow” for his address (rather than “green,” as one might expect of a 
public official)—possibly due to the activities of someone who previously 
lived at his address.266 
Problems with information quality that can lead law enforcement to 
make inaccurate assumptions about the risks associated with a given 
address are not unique to big data analytics, but can be exacerbated by the 
transient nature of low-income communities. A recent Washington Post 
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 263.  Id. 
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express their shared concerns about predictive policing tools. See THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON 
CIVIL & HUMAN RIGHTS ET AL., PREDICTIVE POLICING TODAY: A SHARED STATEMENT OF CIVIL 
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article relayed the story of a 63-year-old grandmother, Sallie Taylor, 
whose home was wrongfully raided by D.C. police one evening in January 
2015. After bursting through her door, pointing a shotgun at her face and 
pushing her to the floor, the officers searched through her belongings for 
thirty minutes and ultimately left empty-handed. Police later discovered 
that, due to outdated information in the court records system, they had 
used the wrong address for the suspect they had been searching to find.267 
Similar scenarios occurred eleven more times in Washington, D.C. over a 
two-year period.268 
While threat scoring generally targets a specific residence or person, 
other predictive policing tools offer a broader portrait of potential crime 
“hot spot” locations that are intended to help police better allocate their 
attention and resources.269 Early versions of these systems required a 
police investigator’s input into the weighting of the variables and 
decisions about how they would be factored into the model, but newer 
systems increasingly rely on machine learning and “[don’t] require a 
human to figure out what variables matter and how much.”270  
One such example is the Hitachi Visualization Predictive Crime 
Analytics tool, which “gobbles massive amounts of data—from public 
transit maps, social media conversations, weather reports, and more—and 
uses machine learning to find patterns that humans can’t pick out.”271 In 
particular, the role of social media input has been described as an 
especially important component of the tool, increasing its predictive 
accuracy by 15%.272 
Location data gleaned from social media posts can be especially 
valuable in big data-driven policing tools. As Mateescu et al. note in their 
discussion of social media surveillance tools currently being used by law 
enforcement, 
Companies like Geofeedia offer products that use the location data 
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of social media posts, when available, and map them. Using these 
maps, clients are able to specify a delimited geographic area and 
view all geotagged posts coming from that location in near real-
time. Use of geotagging features to map social media activity has 
been touted as a crucial tool in assisting first responders in 
emergencies, as well as surveilling areas of concentrated activity, 
such as concerts or public protests. 273 
However, the availability of social media as a viable input depends on 
both a high level of usage among the communities under surveillance and 
the use of public platforms or public settings to make the communications 
broadly accessible to law enforcement. While police departments routinely 
request social media data from specific accounts as part of ongoing 
investigations, they are generally not able to monitor the complete firehose 
of social media data (both public and private) in real-time. Typically, 
social media monitoring systems rely on public social media data streams 
and this allows them to avoid what is seen as a “legal gray area” around 
content not intended for public consumption.274 Given the aforementioned 
propensity of lower-income social media users to post content publicly 
and their tendency to rely on mobile devices that may be more vulnerable 
to law enforcement surveillance, the effective impact of this monitoring is 
not likely to be evenly distributed.  
NC4, which produces the NC4 Signal tool to provide social media 
monitoring for law enforcement, is also designed to “listen” to public 
communications across popular social media platforms, such as Twitter 
and Facebook. The resulting cache of data gathered through the system 
includes text, images, and video that can be filtered and visualized to 
enhance “operational decision-making to ensure optimum results.”275 A 
blog post on the company’s website lists the “pros and cons” of social 
media monitoring and touts the operational benefits of the method, but 
concedes that it can raise some privacy and perception-related concerns: 
“there aren't any true operational drawbacks to using social media 
monitoring software, but it can create problems with reputation and 
perception in the community, as well as with privacy advocates.”276 One 
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such problem is the risk of misinterpretation; when social media posts are 
analyzed outside of the original context in which they were shared, jokes, 
memes, sarcasm, and irony are not taken into account. In addition, 
individuals may be assessed not only by what they choose to post, but also 
by the content that their friends or followers post in association with their 
profile. These problems can be heightened when determinations are made 
largely by algorithms and automated systems, which can exacerbate 
entrenched biases. As Mateescu et al. argue, the removal of human 
judgment in the assessment of risk creates the potential for more 
widespread systematic bias. 
Absent careful review, machine learning techniques applied to social 
media could easily reinforce existing patterns of enforcement, which partly 
reflect a disproportionate focus on people of color. To the extent that they 
replace human discretion, these automated systems may be trading 
individual bias–malicious or otherwise–for a new, systematic bias.277 
2. Legal Analysis of Predictive Policing 
Existing law fails to protect citizens from the potential dangers of 
predictive policing. Simply put, “[t]he rise of big data technologies offers 
a challenge to the traditional paradigm of Fourth Amendment law.”278 The 
Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable government 
searches and seizures.279 The Supreme Court has long ruled that the Fourth 
Amendment protects only objectively reasonable expectations of privacy. 
In Katz v. United States, the Court held that a defendant had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a phone booth.280 Once outside the proverbial 
phone booth, a citizen loses this protection. Thus, there is no Fourth 
Amendment protection for information people share in public or to third 
parties,281 such as “data given to commercial third parties, including 
banking records, telephone call lists, cell phone locations, or Internet 
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search or subscriber information.” 282  
Scholars have argued that this doctrine “should not hold its traditional 
force once the police deploy the tools of big data,”283 and the Supreme 
Court has signaled that the law will need to adapt to emerging 
technologies. In United States v. Jones, the Court held that police 
placement of a GPS device on a suspect’s car without a warrant violated 
the Fourth Amendment because it was a physical intrusion that violated 
the defendant’s right to privacy.284 In this narrow ruling, the Court did not 
endorse the mosaic theory, which the appellate court below had applied.285 
The mosaic theory provides that prolonged surveillance generates 
individual pieces of information that constitute a Fourth Amendment 
search when aggregated.286 In other words, the “whole reveals far more 
than the individual movements it comprises.”287 While the Supreme Court 
majority did not adopt this theory, five Justices intimated they are poised 
to reconsider the notion of reasonable expectations in our digital age. As 
Justice Sotomayor stated in concurrence, “I would ask whether people 
reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in 
a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will, 
their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”288 At this 
time, however, the third-party doctrine prevails. 
Statutes are no bulwark against predictive policing given that existing 
legal protections for health and financial information typically yield to law 
enforcement needs.289 Moreover, if government obtains its information 
from a private data broker such as Beware, even the existing minimal 
statutory requirements for legal process can be evaded.290 And of course, 
the Constitution does not constrain the behavior of private data brokers, 
only government actors.  
Once the police have data in their possession, the issue becomes how 
they can use it. Police may initially want to use predictive analysis to 
conduct surveillance of “persons suspected of ongoing or future criminal 
 
 
 282.  See Ferguson, supra note 278, at 373–74 (footnotes omitted); see also Elizabeth E. Joh, 
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activity.”291 This surveillance phase of policing, undertaken prior to a 
search, detention, or arrest, is not a Fourth Amendment event, and it thus 
does not require individualized suspicion.292 As Elizabeth Joh has 
explained, police have the unfettered discretion to single out certain people 
for investigation based on predictive tools.293 Surveillance could 
potentially bump up against other constitutional rights, but relief through 
these avenues is unlikely. Claims that discretionary surveillance violates 
First Amendment rights of association, such as with police surveillance of 
a group engaging in political activity, often falter on standing grounds.294  
Following surveillance, police may want to stop, question, search, or 
seize a suspect. These phases of police activity require individualized 
suspicion. For a stop and frisk, the police must have a reasonable 
suspicion, and for a more sustained search or an arrest, police must have 
probable cause (and sometimes a warrant). Courts look at a totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether these standards of individualized 
suspicion have been met.295 Traditionally, police developed reasonable 
suspicion through observing activities in the real world and gathering 
information from sources. The process was retrospective and 
particularized, whereas predictive policing is generalized and 
prospective.296   
As Andrew Ferguson explains, the use of big data in predictive 
policing “has the potential to change the reasonable suspicion calculus 
because more personal or predictive information about a suspect will make 
it easier for police to justify stopping a suspect.”297 Big data not only adds 
factors to the totality of circumstances test, but it can also be particularized 
to a specific subject, as courts demand.298 Yet increased granularity in data 
can increase the risks of disparate impact due to inadequacies and 
inaccuracies in data.299 Ferguson thus argues that courts should require a 
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direct link between predictive data about a suspect and police suspicion 
arising from direct observation.300 Whether courts will heed this advice 
remains to be seen.   
Equal Protection claims based on discriminatory police enforcement 
resulting from big data would also likely fail.301 Predictive analytics might 
embed stereotyped views of suspects, but it does so unintentionally.302 The 
Court has held that discriminatory intent is required to prevail under the 
Equal Protection Clause.303 Indeed, even old-fashioned exercises of police 
discretion that result in disparate impacts on minorities are nearly 
impossible to challenge under equal protection.304 
Another concern regarding predictive analytics is the large number of 
mistakes within the data.305 In fact, the FBI’s files, which are regularly 
used for background checks, are known to contain hundreds of thousands 
of mistakes.306 In addition, programmers can make mistakes in creating the 
software and algorithms that analyze the data.307 However, there are no 
meaningful quality controls on shared data and no individual rights to 
learn about or correct mistakes.308 As a constitutional matter, the Supreme 
Court holds that exclusion of evidence from trial that was based on 
erroneous evidence in government databases is required only in cases of 
gross negligence or systemic misconduct.309 Meeting this standard is 
nearly impossible given the difficulty of isolating erroneous material from 
the reams of data involved, as well as the proprietary nature of and secrecy 
underlying the databases.310 In short, whether big data is accurate or error-
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filled, current law provides scant constraint on its use in the criminal 
justice system. 
Predictive policing’s use of social media information gleaned from on-
line networks also raises the specter of guilt by association, which is 
disfavored in our justice system. As the Supreme Court has stated, guilt by 
association is “alien to the traditions of a free society.”311 At the same 
time, “it is beyond debate” that the right of free association “for the 
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of . . . 
`liberty.’”312 However, the right of free association, as currently conceived, 
is largely focused on protecting the ability of formally constituted groups 
to function without government interference.313 For instance, foundational 
Supreme Court cases protected the NAACP from having to turn over its 
membership lists to the government.314 By contrast, many social media 
relationships are between loose networks of friends and acquaintances and 
do not fit this paradigm.315 Furthermore, free association doctrine protects 
communications that are either expressive (meaning political in nature) or 
intimate (such as within families), 316 but not social ones that constitute the 
bulk of web-based chatter.317 In addition, algorithms scoop in metadata 
and other non-content data, which are not words and thus do not have an 
associative dimension as understood in traditional doctrine.318 For all these 
reasons, free association doctrine will need considerable revamping to 
protect against guilt by on-line association.319 
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IV. SUGGESTED REMEDIES AND THEIR EFFICACY FOR LOW-INCOME 
POPULATIONS 
Current legal frameworks offer little protection or recourse for privacy-
related harms experienced by the poor. At present, privacy law in the 
United States is fragmented and sectoral.320 Unlike most other developed 
nations, the United States does not have a single data protection law.321 
Instead, we have industry-specific statutory protections, such as laws that 
govern the health or financial services industries.322 Outside of these 
narrow statutes, the United States relies primarily on self-regulation by the 
entities that gather and maintain personal data and puts the onus on 
individuals to police their own data disclosures.323 Given the gaps in 
United States privacy law, a diverse group of scholars, policymakers, and 
practitioners have made numerous recommendations to enhance personal 
data privacy. Due to the scope and scale of the many detailed and granular 
proposals, this Part neither parses nor endorses them. Rather, this Part 
assesses how some of the most prominent approaches might impact low-
income people and suggests possible improvements to the current privacy 
landscape. The political system is less responsive to low-income than 
wealthy Americans324 and low-income Americans have less access to the 
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justice system.325 As a result, their voices are often silenced, despite their 
heightened vulnerability to privacy intrusions. Thus, our goal is to 
emphasize the privacy concerns facing low-income Americans in current 
policy discussions.  
A. Notice and Choice 
In the absence of broad statutory protections for big data, the FTC and 
the Obama Administration pushed self-regulation by business, largely 
through notice and choice offered to consumers.326 This has been and 
remains the current governing privacy paradigm in the United States.327 
The goal of notice and choice is to provide consumers with information 
about a website’s privacy policy, including its collection, use, and sharing 
practices, in order to allow the consumer to decide whether or not to use a 
certain website.328 This model promotes the important value of self-
autonomy, but assumes a fair contractual bargain between the website and 
the consumer, which is a myth for several reasons. Moreover, the 
assumptions underlying notice-and-choice are likely even more attenuated 
for under-resourced people.   
To begin with, studies show that consumers do not understand website 
privacy notices because they are purposefully complex, lengthy, and 
jargon filled.329 This can be particularly pernicious for less educated 
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consumers, who are also more likely to be low-income.330 Indeed, recent 
surveys have supported earlier research indicating that adults with lower 
levels of education are more likely to falsely assume that when a company 
posts a privacy policy, it ensures the company will keep all of the 
information it collects on users confidential.331 Even the most diligent 
consumer would lack the time to read the hundreds of privacy policies he 
or she might encounter in a single day.332 And that time might be wasted 
given that companies often reserve the right to change their policies in the 
future without additional notice and consent, thus upsetting any initial 
bargain struck by a consumer.333 Complicated privacy policies and 
complex privacy settings may be by design—if websites and social media 
applications require individuals to share information to make money, it 
may be in their best interest to keep individuals in the dark about their use 
of personal data. Moreover, even when a privacy policy is clear and 
comprehensible, consumers have no way to control how their data might 
be used downstream by third parties or later aggregated into a larger 
portfolio of information about them.334 Moreover, a person who opts out of 
a certain website may not be aware that another person’s disclosure 
 
 
1357–58 (2012); Mark A. Graber, Donna M. D’Alessandro & Jill Johnson-West, Reading Level of 
Privacy Policies on Internet Health Web Sites, 51 J. FAM. PRAC. 642, 642 (2002). 
 330.  Notice and choice is no barrier to discrimination, “[i]nstead, giving individuals notice and 
choice may simply perpetuate the growing gap between consumer ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ because the 
least sophisticated consumers remain least likely to protect themselves.” Schmitz, supra note 139, at 
1462–63. See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 209, at 616, 620, 627 (describing the lower levels of 
reading comprehension of low-income persons and how this renders privacy notices useless).  
 331.  See Aaron Smith, What Internet Users Know About Technology and the Web, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Nov. 25, 2014), https://perma.cc/8M7R-ETSX.  
 332.  See Reidenberg, supra note 326, at 492. Aleecia McDonald and Lorrie Cranor calculated that 
if all Americans were to read their privacy policies, the opportunity cost would be $781 billion. 
Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, I/S: J.L. & POL’Y 
FOR INFO. SOC’Y 544, 561 (2008).  
 333.  See Sprague & Ciochetti, supra note 329, at 126; danah boyd & Eszter Hargittai, Facebook 
Privacy Settings: Who Cares?, 15 FIRST MONDAY 1, 2 (2010), https://perma.cc/SQG3-W7SY; Paul 
Ohm, Branding Privacy, 97 MINN. L. REV. 907, 909 (2013) (describing how such privacy lurches (or 
changes in promised policies) “disrupt long-settled expectations” and proposing that privacy policies 
become part of a company’s brand that can only be changed with a new name).   
 334.  See Reidenberg et al., supra note 326, at 492; Schmitz, supra note 139, at 1425; Natalie 
Kim, Three’s a Crowd: Towards Contextual Integrity in Third-Party Data Sharing, 28 HARV. J. L. & 
TECH. 325, 327 (2014) (“privacy policies essentially remain a blunt instrument, giving users a binary 
option between sharing with none or sharing with all . . . .”); Clark D. Asay, Consumer Information 
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implicates them in ways of interest to data miners.335    
Furthermore, notice and choice regimes are no guarantee of privacy. 
Numerous companies have failed to adhere to their stated privacy policies, 
failed to keep data secure, and retained data longer than what users deem 
as reasonable.336 For all these reasons, self-regulation appears inadequate 
alone to protect consumer privacy interests. A major report in 2011 
concluded that companies create self-regulation regimes and rules in 
secret, lack consumer representatives, only involve a fraction of covered 
industries, survive for only short periods, are underfunded, and lack the 
ability to enforce rules or maintain members.337 Often, companies are 
unwilling to self-regulate along even the most basic privacy-protective 
principles.338 Accordingly, scholars have argued that self-regulation can at 
times function as a charade providing cover to industry in lieu of 
substantive regulation.339   
In addition, notice and choice simply cannot protect against certain 
harms, such as failure to adhere to the terms of a notice, negligent security 
practices, or wrongful retention of personal data.340 In other words, notice 
and choice does not protect against broken promises. Other legal 
protections are required to enforce any bargain struck by consumers.   
Even where legal protections exist, such as with FCRA, we need to be 
mindful of the limits of private litigation when it comes to low-income 
individuals. Most low-income consumers will never know that they have 
been subject to adverse action based on personally identifiable 
information. Even if they become aware of a privacy violation, they lack 
the resources to hire a lawyer, and civil legal services satisfy only 14% of 
the legal needs of low-income litigants.341 Statutory damages for privacy 
violations under FCRA are low.342 Many agreements that bind consumers 
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push them into arbitration, rather than court, and arbitration is typically a 
process too expensive for an individual to pursue. In short, there is almost 
no incentive or ability for a private consumer to bring a data privacy claim. 
For all these reasons, notice and choice—even an improved version of 
notice and choice—is not sufficient on its own to protect consumer 
privacy, and it is particularly problematic for low-income Americans. 
B. Digital Literacy 
Given the well-known shortcomings in notice and choice regimes, 
some advocates have argued for greater digital literacy so that people can 
better avail themselves of notice and choice protections. Digital literacy 
refers to the vast array of “technical, cognitive, and sociological skills” 
that individuals need “in order to perform tasks and solve problems in 
digital environments.”343 The term suffers from a lack of precision, and is 
used to refer to: assessing information credibility, mastery of certain 
technical skills, knowledge of computer hardware and peripherals, 
familiarity with software interfaces, social-emotional awareness of digital 
environments, and so forth.344 Digital literacy programs in which 
individuals are taught some of these skills, are often championed as 
potential solutions for privacy violations, particularly when those 
violations could have been prevented by self-help behaviors by 
individuals. Some programs explicitly teach privacy practices and 
behaviors, such as how to change privacy settings on social media, while 
others generally discourage people from sharing online. Some researchers 
postulate that digital literacy programs that improve people’s Internet 
skills may “support, encourage, and empower users to undertake informed 
control of their digital identities.”345  
 One possible interpretation of the results presented in Part II of this 
paper is that privacy education, or increased privacy literacy, may help 
 
 
compensatory damages for an individual plaintiff are low. A violation results in a maximum award of 
$1000, and then only for willful noncompliance, which is hard to prove and which courts rarely find. 
15 U.S.C. §1681n (2012).   
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Digital Era, 13 J. EDUC. MULTIMEDIA & HYPERMEDIA 93 (2004).  
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solve the problems of low-income Internet users. Our empirical data 
suggests that when compared to higher-earning people, low-income users 
are less confident in their ability to manage their privacy settings, 
understand privacy policies, and find tools and strategies that would help 
them protect their personal information online. While privacy literacy may 
help people to feel more effective at managing their information, and may 
reduce some of their exposure to data collection, it is not a sufficient 
solution to the problems that the poor face with regards to privacy and 
information flow. 
 First, as noted above,346 most users find privacy settings and privacy 
policies abstruse and difficult to understand. Second, harms related to data 
collection and dissemination are institutional problems that cannot be fully 
ameliorated through individual use of extant privacy tools, even if data-
related vulnerabilities of the poor are exacerbated by lack of privacy-
protective behaviors (e.g., adjusting privacy settings). Even if individuals 
chose to abstain from social media entirely, their personal information 
would still be collected from a myriad of sources including, but not limited 
to government, public, and court records; motor vehicle and driving 
records; recorded mortgages and tax assessments; catalog and magazine 
subscriptions; store loyalty cards; warranties; the US Census; voter 
registration information; financial records; and others.347 Simply moving 
through a city, using public transportation, or driving on toll roads creates 
a data trail that is almost impossible to avoid.348 Putting the burden on 
individuals alone to protect their privacy ignores the multitude of ways in 
which information is collected, tracked, and aggregated in ways that 
individuals cannot control, and of which they may not be aware. 
Most importantly, emphasizing privacy literacy in the absence of other 
possible reforms shifts the responsibility for privacy protection to the 
individual. This suggests that if an individual’s privacy is violated, it is 
because she did not protect it adequately. This places the fault on the 
individual rather than the person or organization that violated her privacy. 
This rhetoric of individual responsibility is also found in the public debate 
over social services, in which poverty is seen as resulting from a series of 
bad decisions made by individuals, rather than a systemic problem.349 
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This, in turn, justifies some of the wide-reaching privacy violations 
detailed earlier in this document that contribute to the dehumanization of 
the poor, such as welfare home visits, mandatory drug testing, and the like 
in order to receive social services.350 While privacy literacy programs 
provide an important foundation for improving consumer awareness of 
privacy-enhancing tools and strategies, they do little to restrain the larger 
ecosystem of data brokers, consumer profiling and government 
surveillance discussed in this paper.  
C. Due Process 
Several scholars have argued that due process norms should apply to 
big data applications, especially those that impact people’s access to 
credit, employment, education and other life needs.351 Procedural due 
process is enshrined in the Constitution and gives individuals the right to 
notice and a hearing regarding governmental actions that threaten to take 
away their life, liberty, or property.352 While due process rights only attach 
to government actions, the quasi-governmental nature of how private 
entities are determining public access to valuable opportunities makes the 
values of due process—including “transparency, accuracy, accountability, 
participation, and fairness”—appealing in a big data context.353 To enforce 
these values, scholars have recommended that algorithmic formulas be 
made public and that people who are adversely impacted have the right to 
challenge inaccurate information about them or unfair outcomes.   
As in the governmental context, “data due process” may be a limited 
remedy for low-income individuals. To begin with, most people are not 
aware of the extent to which their data are being gathered and aggregated 
to make decisions about them.354 Recognizing this, advocates of this 
approach suggest that every adverse decision against an individual be 
 
 
 350.  See Gilman, Class Differential, supra note 1, at 1391–92; Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A 
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Watts & Nan Marie Astone, Review: The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
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revealed, along with an audit trail that reveals the basis of automated 
decisions.355 When it comes to governmental benefits, a notice and 
explanation of denial is fairly straightforward because these 
determinations are usually made in the context of objective eligibility 
criteria. However, such requirements would engender a radical reshaping 
of the workplace, higher education, and related settings if every 
disappointed applicant were entitled to a reason for their rejection along 
with a dossier of algorithmic formulas that might have contributed to the 
rejection, especially given that big data often interacts with individual 
discretion in these situations.   
Moreover, due process has proved a mixed revolution when it comes to 
public benefits.356 While it has provided low-income people with a forum 
to assert their rights, its shortcomings include a lack of lawyers to enforce 
those rights, an adversarial rather than problem-solving approach, an often 
demeaning and confusing process, and a masking of systemic injustice 
through the framework of individual fair hearings. Thus, in the big data 
context, it would be essential for any due process regime to ensure that 
low-income people have a voice in designing systems for transparency and 
accountability, that their interests are represented by enforcement entities, 
and that enforcement involves systemic review of algorithmic processes 
rather than reliance on individual complaints. 
D. Comprehensive Consumer Privacy Legislation 
The United States’ sectoral approach to privacy is often compared to 
the European Union’s (EU) comprehensive, ex ante approach to 
privacy.357 In the EU, data collection must be limited in scope and 
retention, and data is subject to consumer consent, review, and 
correction.358 Data subjects also have the right not to be subject to 
 
 
 355.  Crawford & Schultz, supra note 48, at 125.   
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decisions with legal effects generated from automated processing.359 In 
2016, the EU passed the General Data Protection Regulation, which 
provides even stronger privacy protections, including a “right to be 
forgotten,” strict consent requirements that place the burden of proof on 
the collector, and increased sanctions for violations.360 The Regulation also 
tightens restrictions on the processing of particularly sensitive information, 
such as race, political opinions, and religion.361 In addition, the Regulation 
gives people the right not to be subject to decisions solely based on 
algorithms, including profiling, and to contest such decisions.362 Almost 
all commentators acknowledge that the United States, with its emphasis on 
personal liberty and corporate innovation, is very unlikely to adopt an 
omnibus privacy statute in the style of the EU, with its emphasis on 
personal dignity.363     
Accordingly, a range of policymakers, business leaders, and privacy 
advocates have argued for comprehensive privacy legislation in the more 
limited sphere of online consumer activity.364 For instance, in 2012, the 
Obama White House issued a proposed Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights 
based on seven principles of individual control: transparency, respect for 
context, security, access, accuracy, focused collection, and 
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accountability.365 This set of baseline protections would give consumers 
the right to determine what data companies collect about them and how 
those data are used, although it envisions a combination of industry self-
regulation and government enforcement.366 Relatedly, the FTC 
recommended in 2014 that Congress enact legislation to regulate the data 
broker industry so that consumers would know about the industry’s 
activities and have access to information held about them by data 
brokers.367 In recent years, Congress has considered, but failed to pass, a 
variety of data privacy bills. 
Almost any of these proposals would enhance data privacy while 
providing companies with greater guidance as to their obligations. For 
low-income consumers in particular, the effectiveness of these laws would 
hinge upon the existence of meaningful sanctions, rigorous oversight by 
governmental or third-party entities of data collection and processing, 
clear notice and consent policies optimized for mobile devices, and a legal 
commitment to identifying and ameliorating harmful and unjustified 
disparate impacts.  
E. Areas for Further Research 
In light of these substantial challenges, there continues to be a great 
need for interdisciplinary research to deepen our understanding of the class 
differential in privacy vulnerability. This Article has sought to provide a 
foundation for further inquiry, describing a matrix of overlapping 
vulnerabilities that low-income communities face in the big data era. As 
this analysis has illustrated, there are both considerable gaps in current 
legal protections and the information available to the public to assess the 
fairness of the rapidly evolving methods of automated decision-making in 
employment, education, and law enforcement contexts. These gaps are 
especially acute when considering the role of social media and network-
based assessments, the technical details of which are largely opaque and 
ripe for further investigation by researchers.  
Additional studies could further explore the connection between a 
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 367.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 57, at 49.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol95/iss1/6
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017] PRIVACY, POVERTY, AND BIG DATA 123 
 
 
 
 
 
reliance on mobile access among low-income Internet users and increased 
vulnerability to data broker profiling. Looking specifically at social media 
exposure, deeper analyses of what kinds of content are made public by 
default across different mobile versions of social media platforms would 
build upon prior work examining changes in default sharing settings over 
time across popular social network sites.368 Future empirical studies could 
also explore the public’s awareness of social media monitoring in these 
environments and how this varies across socioeconomic groups.   
Looking ahead, it is likely that data-driven innovation and its 
associated economic efficiencies will continue to outpace the 
implementation of legal constraints to prevent potentially biased or unfair 
decision making practices for low-income communities. Ultimately, the 
complexity of the current technological and legal environments will 
increasingly require researchers and advocates to employ a range of 
methods to ensure that the interests of those who are most vulnerable to 
privacy-related harms are not overlooked or written off as necessary 
collateral for realizing the benefits of the big data era. 
CONCLUSION 
We live in an age of increasing income and wealth inequality with an 
economic gulf between the rich and poor and a stagnating middle-class. 
Data-driven systems could play a role in reversing these trends by 
expanding access to education, employment, and justice for marginalized 
populations. However, they might conversely contribute to a widening of 
that gap by providing a ready avenue to prey on the vulnerabilities of low-
income people, or to exclude them from opportunities due to biases 
entrenched in algorithmic decision-making tools. Historically, poor people 
have faced much greater surveillance than their wealthier counterparts, and 
anti-poverty advocates are rightfully concerned that the digital world will 
replicate, if not reinforce, both covert and overt patterns of surveillance. 
For their part, low-income Americans express greater concerns regarding 
data collection in a variety of contexts, but they are more likely to access 
the Internet from less secure mobile devices, and to report lower usage of 
privacy settings and protective strategies. The three case studies in this 
Article highlight some forms of potentially harmful discrimination that 
low-income Americans might face when data analytics are used in hiring, 
 
 
 368.  See supra note 96. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
124 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 95:53 
 
 
 
 
college admissions, and law enforcement. In each setting, low-income 
Americans face not only adverse inferences drawn based on their 
personally identifiable information (which often is erroneous), but also 
those drawn from their social media and demographic networks. Existing 
law provides little recourse, as it mostly pre-dates the proliferation of the 
Internet and favors business rather than consumer interests through a self-
regulatory regime. Given that the political system tends to be less 
responsive to the needs of low-income Americans and that they often lack 
access to the justice system, it is imperative that policy discussions around 
digital privacy increasingly include the voices and perspectives of low-
income people. 
APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF SURVEY METHODS 
The survey on Privacy and Security Experiences of Low-
Socioeconomic Status Populations, sponsored by the Data & Society 
Research Institute, obtained telephone interviews with a nationally 
representative sample of 3000 adults ages eighteen and older living in the 
United States. Interviews were completed in both English and Spanish, 
according to the preference of the respondent. The survey was conducted 
by Princeton Survey Research Associates International (PSRAI). The 
interviews were administered by Princeton Data Source from November 
18 to December 23, 2015. A combination of landline and cell phone 
random-digit dial (RDD) samples was used to reach respondents 
regardless of the types of telephone they have access to. Both samples 
were disproportionately stratified to target low-income households. A total 
of 1050 interviews were conducted with respondents on landline 
telephones and 1950 interviews were conducted with respondents on 
cellular phones, including 1193 who live in a household with no landline 
telephone access. 
Statistical results are weighted to correct for the disproportionate 
sample design, the overlapping landline and cell sample frames and 
disproportionate non-response across demographic groups that might bias 
results. The final weighted total sample is representative of all adults ages 
eighteen and older living in the United States. The margin of sampling 
error for the complete set of weighted data is ±2.7 percentage points. 
One inherent limitation of survey research is what is known as “social 
desirability bias.” The Pew Research Center’s methodology experts 
describe this as people’s “natural tendency to want to be accepted and 
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liked,” which may in turn lead people to report inaccurate answers to 
questions that probe on sensitive subjects.369 In addition, it may be the case 
that surveys underreport privacy concerns and sensitivities because those 
who respond to surveys are generally more comfortable sharing 
information about themselves. In terms of mode effects, however, recent 
studies have suggested that there are not meaningful differences between 
telephone and online surveys with respect to the degree people express 
worries about computers and technology “being used to invade 
privacy.”370  
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